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THE CONFLICTS PROBLEM
BETWEEN THE LONGSHOREMEN'S ACT
AND STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACTS UNDER THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
Arthur Larson*
The purpose of this article" 0 is to analyze in a preliminary way the
new conflicts problems created by the 1972 amendments to the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Longshoremen's Act).'
Indeed, the boundary between state workmen's compensation acts and
federal involvement in waterfront injuries has, through the exertions of
the Supreme Court and the Congress, undergone a major shift no less than
seven times in sixty years. This convoluted and often tedious story need
not be retold here,2 although some references to it may be necessary from
time to time to make the present position intelligible. The seven phases
through which this relationship has passed may at this point be merely
identified in a categorical way: Phase I: unqualified federal preeminence
in injuries over navigable waters.3 Phase II: the "maritime but local" excep-
tion to the absolute preeminence of federal power.4 Phase III: the passage
of the Longshoremen's Act in 1927, containing two limitations: occurrence
of the injury upon navigable waters and applicability only "if recovery
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1. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (Supp. 1976) amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970).
2. For a complete account of this development, see 4 A. LAnso., TAE LA.w OF
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for the disability of death through workmen's compensation proceedings
may not be validly provided by state law."5 Phase IV: the "twilight zone"
rule of Davis v. Department of Labor & Industry6 under which the Supreme
Court declined to review cases falling within a broad zone of uncertainty
under the "absence of state power" and "maritime but local" tests. Phase V:
the "concurrent jurisdiction" rule of Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moore7 and
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.,8 under which the Supreme Court de-
clined to disturb assumption by either state acts or the Longshoremen's Act
of jurisdiction even over areas previously assigned to the other during
Phases II and III; in the process the Court effectively deleted from the
Act the "absence of state power" limitation. Phase VI: the dominance of the
"navigable waters" test, under which the Longshoremen's Act always applied
to injuries over navigable waters,9 and never applied to injuries not over
navigable waters.'0 Phase VII: the "status" and expanded "situs" tests of
the 1972 amendments, which are the concern of this article.
In October 1972, Congress amended the Longshoremen's Act to create
a two-tiered test of coverage. The two components of that test may be
called the situs and the status requirements, The situs test consists of the
previous navigable waters rule, expanded to embrace adjoining areas of
the sort that might ordinarily be the setting for injuries in maritime employ-
ment. It is found in the section on "Coverage," which formerly was lim-
ited to injuries "occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States
(including any dry dock)."" The amendment enlarges the parenthetical
passage, so that the full paragraph reads as follows:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect
of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry
dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, re-
pairing, or building a vessel). 12
The status test is entirely new. Before 1972 there was nothing in the
act limiting the concept of "employee" in terms of the character of the
5. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 3(a),
44 Stat. 1426 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1970).
6. 317 U.S. 249, 256 (1942).
7. 335 U.S. 874, aff'g mein., In re Moores' Case, 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 473(1948).
8. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
9. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 126-27 (1962).
10. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 215 (1969).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970).
12. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 3(a), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 903(a) (Supp. 1976).
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worker's activities. 13 After 1972 the claimant must satisfy not only the situs
test as to the injury, but also the following status test embodied in the
definition of "employee":
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged
in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship
repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not
include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net.14
Two other changes were made, neither of which appear to have much
substantive importance. The words, "if recovery for the disability or death
through workmen's compensation proceedings may not be validly pro-
vided by State law," were deleted.13 As noted earlier, this clause had in
effect been judicially repealed in Calbeck.16
. The other minor change is the expansion of the definition of "employer"
to match the definition of employee:
The term "employer" means an employer any of whose em-
ployees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in
part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including
any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way,
marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an
employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel).1 7
The unimportance of this change stems from the fact that the force
of the "employer" definition seems to be entirely derivative from the two
basic tests of situs and employee status. It has been repeatedly held that,
once the claimant's status as an "employee" is established, the employer
automatically becomes an "employer" covered by the act.s The Fourth
13. The definition formerly read: "The term 'employee' does not include a
master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to
load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net." Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 2(3), 44 Stat. 1425 (1927).
14. Longshoremen's -and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 902(3) (Supp. 1976).
15. Compare Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509,
§ 3(a), 44 Stat. 1426 (1927) with 33 U.S.C.A. § 903(a) (Supp. 1976).
16. 370 US. 114 (1962). Refer to text accompanying note 8 supra.
17. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act § 2(4), 33 U.S.C.A.§ 902(4) (Supp. 1976), amending ch. 509, § 2(4), 44 Stat. 1425 (1927). The defini-
tion formerly read: "The term 'employer' means an employer any of whose employees
are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any dry dock.)" Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 2(4), 44 Stat. 1425 (1927).
18. Blundo *v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. 376 (1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. grantcd, 97 S. Ct. 5"22
(1977); Tourville v. Portland Stevedoring Co., 3 Bencfits Review Board Serv. (Ad.
L.J.) 51 (1976); Dubay v. FMC Marine & Rail Equip Corp. 3 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. LJ.) 43 (1976); Anderson v. McBroom Rig Bldg. Serv., Inc., 2 Benefits
Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 97 (1975); MeMenomon v. Northeast Terminal Co.,
2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 51 (1975).
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Circuit said as much in I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board:10
Section 4 of the amended Act, 33 U.S.C. § 904, limits liability
for compensation to an "employer" as defined in § 2(4), 33 U.S.C.§ 902(4). The definition is so drafted that it aVpears that an
employer will always be liable for his "employees' covered inju-
ries. It therefore does not prescribe another, additional test for
coverage.20
It may seem poignant in the extreme that the Longshoremen's Act,
having, after forty-two years of uncertainty and floundering, finally in 1969
achieved a unitary and almost litigation-free rule on coverage, should now
be plunged back into what promises to be a doubly prolific generator of
litigation - the two-part test, each part of which has boundaries that are
novel, undefined, and uninterpreted - not to mention the reopening of all
the old questions about "twilight zone" and concurrent coverage of state
and federal law. By 1976 there were already dozens of cases exploding
all over the country and reaching appellate courts in practically every
circuit.
Obviously there had to be some overpowering reason to account for
this scramble back into the morass only a few years after belatedly reaching
solid ground. The reason was not some intellectual preference for a supe-
rior conflict-of-laws theory. The reason was money.
For a number of years before 1972, the Longshoremen's Act maximum
weekly benefit had stayed firm at $70 a week. The reason it remained
constant was that longshoremen were routinely getting large unseaworthi-
ness verdicts against shipowners, who in turn routinely passed the burden
along to the stevedoring employer under the Ryan doctrine.2' Since the
claimant was often getting - and his employer ultimately paying - a much
higher amount than any compensation award, the pressure for increasing
compensation benefits was somewhat drained off, and the justification
for placing yet another burden on the long-suffering stevedoring firm was
weakened.
By 1971 there were eleven maritime states whose maximum weekly
benefits for permanent total disability were higher than those afforded by
the Longshoremen's Act: Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Wash-
ington.
The inevitable result of this disparity was that, in the conflict-of-laws
picture, the traffic was made up mostly of claimants trying to avoid the
federal act and claim under a state act.22 Indeed, this was the situation as
19. 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), modified on rehearing, 542 F.2d 903 (1970)
(en banc), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No. 76-730).
20. 529 F.2d at 1083.
21. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 133-34 (1950).
See 3 A. LAHasoN, supra note 2, §§ 76.43-.53.
22. See 2a A. LAmoN, supra note 2, § 89.40 at nn.54 & 55 for a compilation of
these cases.
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far back as the original Davis "twilight zone" case,23 as well as in the next
landmark cases of Moores24 and Baskin.-' As long as state coverage remained
generally more advantageous, the severe limitation of the Longshoremen's
Act imposed by Nacirema20 as to injuries upon navigable waters was hardly
a source of distress to longshoremen. But when in 1972 the maximum long-
shoremens benefits were more than doubled, going initially from $70 to
$167, the federal-state comparison was turned upside down. Later, as of
1975, the maximum weekly benefit for permanent total disability under
the Longshoremen's Act had reached $318.38. Only one state, Alaska, had
a higher maximum: $358.00. In most of the other important maritime states,
the basic state maximum was now less than half of this, and sometimes a
third or less: New York, $95; Massachusetts, $95; New Jersey, $128; Florida,
$112; Louisiana, $85; Texas, $70; California, $119.
The quid pro quo for this spectacular increase in compensation bene-
fits was the abolition of the seaworthiness warranty for longshoremen
together with the Ryan type of recovery over by the shipowner against the
stevedoring firm.
Consequently, from 1972 on, in every state except Alaska, there has
naturally been tremendous motivation from the claimant's point of view
to broaden the reach of the Longshoremen's Act as widely as possible,
beginning with the expanded situs test in the amendments themselves.
If it was awkward for a longshoreman in New York harbor to walk out
of an $80 act into a $70 act every time he crossed a gangplank onto a ship,
it would have been intolerable, under the amendments, for him to walk
out of a $167 act into an $80 act every time he crossed the gangplank
back to dry land - not to mention walking out of a $318 act into a $95 act
in 1975.
Even under the pre-1972 conditions, the Supreme Court in Nacirema
had indicated its awareness of the awkwardness of this in-and-out kind of
coverage, but had referred the problem back to Congress, which had cre-
ated the problem in the first place by its unqualified use of occurrence
of the injury upon navigable waters as a coverage test. An even less subtle
call to Congress was contained in the Supreme Court's opinion in Victonj
Carriers, Inc. v. Law,2 7 where the Court said that "if denying federal reme-
23. Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249 (1942). Refer to text
accompanyin note 6 supra.
24. Bethehem Steel Co. v. Moore, 335 U.S. 874, af'g mcm., In re Moores' Case,
323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948). Refer to text accompanying note 8 supra.
25. Baskin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (1949). In Baskin the
Court cited Moores' Case in effect to require, not merely permit, a state court to make
an award in the "twilight zone."
26. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
27. 404 U.S. 202 (1971). This decision in effect applied the approach in Naci-
rema to the task of drawing the line between suits against shipowners based on unsea-
worthiness and state workmen's compensation claims. The plaintiff longshoreman was
injured by an alleged defect in his stevedore employer's pier-based forlift truck while
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dies to longshoremen injured on land is intolerable, Congress has ample
power under Articles I and III of the Constitution to enact a suitable
solution. "28
As just sketched, the denial indeed did become intolerable when the
federal benefits were more than doubled. The result was the expansion of
the situs test to a degree which was obviously intended to eliminate the
in-and-out problem in the great bulk of covered waterfront activities. The
Victory Carriers statement was in fact noted in the Senate hearings on the
amendments. 29
Before commencing a detailed analysis of the effect of the 1972 cover-
age tests in practice, one further preliminary observation is in order. All
the longshoreman was operating it on the dock transferring cargo to a point alongsido
the vessel where it was to be hoisted aboard by the ship's own gear. The longshoreman
brought an action against the ship and the shipowner based on unseaworthiness of tho
vessel and the negligence of the shipowner. The shipowner filed a third-party com-
plaint against the stevedoring company for indemnity in the event that the shipowner
was held liable. Both actions were dismissed on motions for summary judgment. Tho
Fifth Circuit reversed, on the theory that the concept of loading the ship was broad
enough to include the plaintiff's activity here, and on the assumption that loading
and unloading activities were sufficiently identified with the ship to permit unscawor-
thiness actions, particularly in light of the Supreme Court decision in Gutlerrez v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963). The Supreme Court in turn reversed the
udgment of the court of appeals, and held that state law and not the federal maritime
law governed when the injury occurred on a dock as a result of an alleged defect
in the employee's own employer's forklift. 404 U.S. at 204. The Court began by strongly
reasserting the basic rule that the maritime tort jurisdiction of the federal courts Is
determined by the locality of the accident and that maritime law governs only those
torts occurring on the navigable waters o? the United States. Id. at 205. The Court
traced in detail the history of the problem of drawing the line between maritime and
state jurisdiction, but emphasized that the area of uncertainty bad been on the seaward
side of the "Jensen line,' not on the landward side. The Nacirema case was quoted
at some length in connection. Id. at 208 n.7. As to the Gutierrez case, which was the
strongest authority the plaintiff had, and which was heavily relied on by the dissent
of justices Douglas and Brennan, the Court argued that the source of the injury was
defective apparatus connected with the ship, whereas in the instant case the defective
mechanism was entirely separate from the ship and, moreover, was the property and
responsibility of the stevedoring company. Id. at 210-11, 213-14. The Gutierrez case
was based on the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, which provides that "the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases
of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, not-
withstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land." 46 U.S.C.
§ 740 (1970). In Gutierrez the source of the accident was defective cargo containers
belonging to the ship, which had spilled some beans on the dock, on which the long-
shoreman slipped. 373 U.S. 206, 207 (1963). The distinction between Gutierrez and
the instant case might appear rather slender on the facts, but the crucial difference
was that an instrumentality of the ship was involved in the one and not in the other.
The Court was definitely unwilling to broaden the boundaries of maritime jurisdiction
to include any loading or unloading activities associated with the ship, not only because
it could find no decisional or statutory authority for so doing, but also because the
prospect of defining the new and broader area of 'loading and unloading activities"
was a rather forbidding one, particularly in view of the confusion that bad already
grown up on that issue among the lower federal courts. As to the broad policy issues
involved, the Court pointed out that the longshoreman already had a no-fault remedy
available to him in the form of workmen's compensation and that therefore the only
thing at stake was the amount of his recovery rather than the fact of recovery. 404
U.S. at 215. Moreover, under the Ryan case the stevedoring company would probably
wind up paying the bill in either event.
28. 404 U.S. at 216.
29. Hearings on S. 2138, S. 525 & S. 1547 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1972).
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the emphasis up to this point (and in congressional and public discussions
at the time) on the "expansion" of Longshoremens Act coverage should not
be allowed to obscure the fact that the expansion took place solely in the
enlargement of the situs covered. The addition of the status test is not
an expansion but a contraction. This is necessarily so because, before 1972,
there was no requirement whatever that this employee be in maritime
employment. The only reference to maritime employment was in the defi-
nition of -employer."3 To be a covered employer, the employer must have
had at least one employee in "maritime employment" - but it did not have
to be this employee. Suppose a railway had several true maritime em-
ployees. Then suppose one of its brakemen, who never did any work even
remotely resembling longshoring, entered a ship to use the men's room,
and was injured. The Longshoremen's Act by its literal terms would clearly
have applied.
It is not difficult to reconstruct the reason why the enlarged situs test
had to be accompanied by something like the new status test Without such
a limitation every nonmaritime employee of any employer who had so much
as one maritime employee would be covered if he merely happened to be
somewhere in a terminal, warehouse, shipyard or other adjoining area.
The Benefits Review Board, which is the quasi-judicial administrative
appellate body set up by the 1972 amendments, at one time took the posi-
tion that anyone who had been covered before 1972 was necessarily cov-
ered after 1972. In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore'1 the question was whether
a pondman employed by a lumber company was covered after 1972. The
pond qualified as "navigable waters," and the company did indeed have
some other employees in maritime employment. Before 1972, then, as the
Ninth Circuit conceded, plaintiff would have been covered. The court con-
tinued: "The Board correctly stated: 'One of the purposes of the 1972
amendment to the Act was to extend coverage inland from the water's
edge, not to narrow its scope. "
At this point, however, the court found that the Board had allowed
itself to be carried away by a kind of freehand impression of the amend-
ments as being exclusively expansive: "The Board then inexplainably
found and concluded: '[A]nyone covered under the Act prior to the 1972
amendments must indeed be permitted to come within its protection sub-
sequent to the amendments.'"33 The court observed a little later: "The
Board's erroneous conclusion that Claimant is entitled to LHCA benefits
stems from a misinterpretation of the frequently stated 'expansion' of cover-
age by the 1972 amendments. This expansion refers only to the broadened
definition of 'navigable waters .... .'"
30. Refer to text accompanying note 17 supra.
31. 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denicd, 97 S. Ct. 179 (1976).
32. 528 F.2d at 959.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 960.
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Finally, the court summed up the purpose of the amendments by
approving the position of the Administrative Law Judge, who bad been
overruled by the Board:
We join in the observation of the Law Judge that the intent
of Congress in extending the Act was not to "open the doors" to
all employees, but to minimize the adverse effect of a shoreside
location or situs when a maritime employee is injured.35
In this instance, the employee worker was found to be a lumbermill
worker with no relation to "maritime employment" in the traditional sense.3
I. TAE SITus TEST: NAVlGABLE WATERs AND ADJOINING AmEAS
The situs test under the 1972 amendments limits coverage to injuries
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any
adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway,
or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unload-
ing, repairing, or building a vessel)."37
Three kinds of questions of construction can be identified in the new
language, which consists of all the italicized parenthetical material, except
the words "dry dock," which were there before 1972. The first question
concerns the meaning of the word "adjoining," which, it must be stressed,
precedes both the list of explicitly named areas and the catchall phrase.
The second question concerns the meaning of specifically named areas,
such as "pier," "wharf," and "terminal." The third concerns the catchall
phrase, "adjoining areas customarily used by an employer in loading,
unloading, repairing or building a vessel."
As a matter of punctuation and grammar, it would appear that the
qualifying clause at the end ("customarily used," etc.) modifies only the
words "other adjoining area." If it had been meant to modify the words
"pier," "vharf," "terminal," etc., a comma would have been placed after
the words "other adjoining area." Assuming that this construction is cor-
rect, the process of proof of ifclusion, as to any of the specifically listed
areas, would consist of only two steps: a showing that the area was indeed
a "pier," "terminal," or other listed facility, and a showing that it "adjoined"
navigable waters. But as to areas not expressly named, the first step would
involve a somewhat different type of proof. The particular area in question
would itself have to be shown to be "customarily used" for one of the
four purposes mentioned. The presumption seems to be that the expressly
named facilities are customarily used for these purposes, so long as they
adjoin navigable waters. All other areas must establish their credentials by
a functional analysis of their customary use and, in addition, would have
35. Id. at 961.
36. Id. at 962.
37. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 903(a) (Supp. 1976) (new material in italics).
(Vol. 14:287
LONGSHOREMEN'S ACT AMENDMENTS CONFLICTS
to satisfy the "adjoining" requirement.
A. Meaning of "adjoining"
As just noted, both the named areas and the "other" areas are covered
only if "adjoining." If an area or facility is not specifically named, but if
it is within an area that is specifically named and that adjoins navigable
waters, this is sufficient38 The most common application of this generali-
zation is that a warehouse is covered if it is within a "terminal" that adjoins
navigable waters,a and in such a case the distance of the warehouse itself
from navigable waters is immaterial, whether it be 72 feet,40 100 yards,4"
685 feet, 800 feet, ' 850 feet" or even 2000 feet.45
The more difficult type of problem is that in which the particular facil-
ity is neither itself contiguous to navigable waters nor within a terminal
that in turn is contiguous to navigable waters. Thus, in Santumo v. Sea-
Land Service, Inc., 46 the warehouse in question was not "inside" a terminal
but was across the street from the employer's main yard, which itself was
adjacent to a navigable waterway. The Board ruled that this slight physical
interruption did not rob the area as a whole of its "adjoining area" charac-
ter. On the particular facts, this decision was not particularly surprising.
The entire area belonged to the employer, and was known as the Sea-Land
Terminal. The particular warehouse "played an integral part in the load-
ing and unloading process." The Board first cited and relied on several
cases, of the kind already mentioned, for the proposition that "terminal'
includes "all the facilities within the terminal area." Obviously, "within
38. See Cabrera v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 297
(1976). In Cabrera the Board stated: "'The word 'terminal' has been held to include
all the facilities within the terminal area. Vinciquerra v. Transocean Cateway Corp.,
1 Benefits Review Board Serv. 523 (1975)." 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. at 300.
39. LT.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), modified
on rehearing, 542 F.2d 903 (1976) (en bane). In I.T.O. one of the claimants was
injured in a warehouse or transit shed 685 feet from the water's edge within a terminal.
Another worked in a warehouse 850 feet from the waters edge in a terminal. The court
said:
We have no doubt that each of the claimants satisfies the situs test of
the post-1972 Act. As a minimum, they were injured at a terminal, adjoining
navigable waters, used in the overall process of loading and unloading a vessel.
Id. at 1083-84.
40. Richardson v. Great Lakes Storage & Contracting Co., 2 Benefits Reviev
Board Serv. 31, 32 (1975).
41. Robinson v. Northern Metal Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.)
240 (1975).
42. I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1082 (4th Cir. 1975),
modified on rehearing, 542 F.2d 903 (1976) (en bane).
43. Brown v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 Benefits Review Board Sem. 212, 213(1974).
44. LT.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1082 (4th Cir. 1975),
modified on rehearing, 542 F.2d 903 (1976) (en bane).
45. Cabrera v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 297, 300(1976).
46. 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 262 (1976).
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the terminal area" is a little broader than "within the terminal" and can
effortlessly be made to include a facility immediately across the street.
But the Board went further and invoked a generalization that, taken
literally, could become the focal point of almost unlimited controversy
and litigation: "An adjoining area as defined by the Act must be deemed
bounded only by the limits of its use as a maritime enterprise."47
It does not take a particularly vivid imagination to see what this prin-
ciple will lead to in practice. For example, in Allen v. Sea-Land Service,
Inc.,48 the warehouse in question was two city blocks from dockside, over
a road controlled by conventional traffic signals. This was held to be on
navigable waters because it was part of a dockside facility used for loading
and unloading vessels.
If two blocks - then why not two miles? Or twenty? Or two hundred?
The only limit is said to be the facility's "use as a maritime enterprise."
Presumably the maritime commerce could be alleged to continue for almost
any distance, provided its maritime purpose continued, and did not change
into landward delivery and distribution.
This is not to say that the two decisions just cited were wrong. On their
facts they are probably right, in that a street or even two blocks hardly
seems enough of a physical separation to justify subdividing an obviously
integrated waterfront operation. The purpose here is merely to utter an
early warning against becoming embarked upon a progressive geographical
expansion in which each widened concentric circle is compared with the
last, until the original statutory boundary is irretrievably lost.
As a matter of statutory construction, the most obvious criticism of
the Board's generalization is that it leaves the word "adjoining" with nothing
to contribute. The full clause involved reads: "other adjoining area cus-
tomarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building
a vessel." The Board's dictum accurately describes the effect of the phrase
beginning "customarily used." The word "use" is the key word in each
case, the Board's phrase being "use as a maritime enterprise." If this is
all there is to the rule, why was "adjoining" hooked on at the beginning,
not once but twice? The answer, once more, is that Congress intended a
dual coverage test - one part of which related to function, and one to
geography. Congress could have extended coverage to the outer limits of
maritime commerce, enterprise, or contract, but did not. It drew a physical
boundary, beginning with navigable waters as such, and then expanding
to "adjoining" areas, adding, in the case of "other areas," the requirement
of customary use in named maritime activities. The word "adjoining" is a
word descriptive of a physical relationship of proximity. It cannot realis-
47. Id. at 266.
48. 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 96 (1975). See Sea-Land Serv.,Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir.
1976).
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tically be stretched to include some sort of relationship of purpose or
function.
The kind of minefield that lies ahead appears even more ominous
when one turns to the version of the same problem presented by shipbuild-
ing activities.
In Luker v. Ingalls Shipbuilding,49 the claimant was injured in a "pre-
outfitting area," located approximately 1,000 feet from the nearest water's
edge. One gets the impression that this site was within the employer's
overall shipyard complex, but the facts do not make it clear whether this
particular shed was physically within a single shipyard, or whether it
might have been separated from it by public streets or other property not
belonging to this employer. The Board appears to treat such distinctions
as immaterial, so long as the area is functionally part of the shipbuilding
process. The Board said: "The actual distance of the area from the water's
edge is not a determinative factor in resolving the question of situs under
the Act."50
This is undoubtedly true, so long as the facility is part of a larger
area which itself is contiguous to navigable water, as in the case of a
warehouse located within a terminal. It cannot, however, be said with
equal assurance that contiguity is not a determinative factor, and the
Board does not reveal the key facts on which that question would turn.
The Board used exactly the same approach in Morgan v. Ingalls Ship-
building Corp.,51 decided on the same day. Morgan was killed in a shop
used for fabrication of parts that were later used in the construction and
repair cf ships and other seagoing vessels. In this opinion we are given
neither the facts on contiguity nor the facts on distance from water. The
court disposes of the entire question with the same sweeping formula
noted earlier in connection with a terminal case:52
An adjoining area as defined in the Act must be deemed
bounded only by the limits of its use as a maritime enterprise. The
entire facility at which Morgan worked was designed and used
for ship construction and repair. Therefore, the jurisdictional
requirements of Section 3(a) of the Act are satisfied.p
49. 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 321 (1976).
50. Id. at 325.
51. 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 310 (1976).
52. Refer to text accompanying note 47 supra.
53. 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. at 313. For administrative law judge decisions
holding various points in a shipyard area covered, see the following: Dubay v. n1C
Marine & Rail Equip. Corp., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 43 (1975)
(claimant was injured while working as a rigger on an overhead crane which was to
be used in marine assembly or parts fabrication); Kininess v. Alabama Dry Dock &
Shipbuilding Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 24 (1975) (site of the
accident was also a crane which claimant was sandblasting, in an area used for storage
and maintenance of the crane, which in turn was used in shipbuilding and repair);
Roberts v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad L.J.) 158 (1975)
(shipyard foreman slipped on steps near the employer's dock building, about 200 feet
from where vessels were docked); Mohamed v. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp., 2 Benefits
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A process strikingly similar to that involving terminals was not long
in getting started. In Maxin v. Dravo Corp.54 the situs at stake was a struc-
tural shop in which components of all kinds of marine products were pre-
assembled. The employer attempted to rely on the fact that a thoroughfare,
Grande Avenue, ran between the structural shop and the major body
of navigable water. As in the terminal case, the Board rejected this argu-
ment out of hand, calling it "illusory." The Board stressed that this facility
was part of a large integrated shipyard, and that merely being bisected
by a public road was of no consequence. Again, the Board uttered the
formula equating "adjoining" with "use as a martime enterprise."
So far, so good. But inevitably will come the cases in which the parts
fabrication shop is two blocks, two miles or two hundred miles away.
Assuming that the parts being fabricated are identical to those fabricated
in the cases already decided, how can the Board say that this fabrication
is any less within the limits of maritime enterprise? And if this is the
holding, again the question will be raised, "whatever happened to the word
'adjoining' "?
It is quite common for components of ships to be fabricated in all kinds
of specialized shops in different parts of the country. Similarly, recalling
that two of the law judge cases involved crane maintenance, one may also
look forward to claims that repair work on machinery used in shipbuilding
must itself be deemed to take place in an area adjoining navigable waters
- no matter where it takes place.
Once more it can be concluded that, although the Board is undoubted-
ly right in holding that a mere bisecting of an integrated shipyard or
terminal by a public road should be immaterial, it will eventually, and
perhaps very soon, have to work out a much more refined and restricted
formula than its rule that "adjoining" follows "maritime enterprise," to deal
with the foreseeable pressure to expand the relatively generous longshore-
men's benefits to an ever-widening circle of parts fabricators, machine
repairers and storage warehouses that are not so obviously within an inte-
grated waterfront operation.
B. Terminals; Loading and Unloading Areas
The word "terminal" is not defined in the amended act, and almost
none of the numerous cases holding an area covered as being within a
Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 85 (1975) (situs of injury was a "slab area" In a ship-
yard in which components for vessels were built, separated from a dry dock by a
30-foot causeway).
54. 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 372 (1975).
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"terminal" have ventured such a definition, presumably because the point
was not in controversy in these cases. At least a partial definition may
be found in the syllabus in Santumo: "A warehouse at which cargo is re-
ceived from and delivered to vessels, and packed into and removed from
containers, is a terminal within the meaning of Longshoremen's Act Sec-
tion 3(a) .... f,6
But, of course, terminals include much more than warehousing facili-
ties. Indeed, as had been seen earlier: 57 "The word 'terminal' has been held
to include all the facilities within the terminal area." 8 Thus, it includes a
railroad platform within the terminal from which claimant was unloading
pipe onto a freight car.59
It was noted earlier that, for reasons of grammar and punctuation, the
qualifying phrase "customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
repairing, or building a vessel" seems to attach only to the words "other
adjoining area," and not to the specifically named facilities, such as termi-
nals. In any event, it should be stressed that the use of the article "an"
before the word "employer" clearly shows that it is never necessary to
show that the area was necessarily customarily used by this employee's
employer for these purposes. Thus, in Blundo v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 6D the claimant was injured while working as a checker
with a crew of men who were stripping a container at the 19th Street
Pier, within the employer's terminal at Brooklyn. The containers had been
off-loaded at a different pier and brought to this terminal by truck for
stripping. The Board said:
55. See I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd. 529 F.-)d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975),
modified on rehearing, 542 F.2d 903 (1976) (en bane); Perez v. United Terminals,
Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 368 (1976); Cabrera v. Maher Terminals, Inc.,
3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 297 (1976); Santumo v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 3
Benefits Review Board Serv. 262 (1976); Bradshaw v. J.A. MeCarthey, Inc., 3
Benefits Review Board Serv. 195 (1976); Caputo v. Northeast Marine Terminal
Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 13 (1975); Bryant v. Ayers S.S. Co., 2 Benefits
Review Board Serv. 408 (1975); Mezzina v. Marine Terminals Corp., 2 Benefits
Review Board Serv. 401 (1975); Blundo v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 376 (1975); Lopez v. Atlantic Container Lines,
Ltd., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 265 (1975); Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son,
Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 99 (1975); Richardson v. Great Lakes Storage &
Contracting Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 31 (1975); Brown v. Maritime Termi-
nals, Inc., 1 Benefits Review Board Serv. 212 (1974); Logan v. Universal Terminal
Stevedoring Corp., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 55 (1975); Tourville v.
Portland Stevedoring Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 51 (1975); Robin-
son v. Northern Metal Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 240 (1975);
Ascione v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad.
L.J.) 230 (1975); Farrell v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad.
L.J.) 84 (1975); Ridgely v. Great Lakes Storage & Contracting Co., 2 Benefits Review
Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 63 (1975).
56. Santumo v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.)
909 (1975), aff'd, 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 262 (1976).
57. Refer to note 38 supra.
58. Santumo v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 262, 265-66
<1976).
59. Ascione v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 230 (1975).
60. 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 376 (1976).
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Since the claimant was injured within a terminal customarily
used by an employer in loading or unloading vessels, even though
at a neighboring pier rather than the specific pier where the claim-
ant was working, the jurisdictional requirement of Section 3(a) is
satisfied.61
C. Shipbuilding and Repair Areas
Several types of facilities used in shipbuilding and repair are specif-
ically listed in Section 3(a): "any adjoining... dry dock... building way,
marine railway...." It is interesting that among the specific areas listed,
there is no counterpart to the broad word "terminal" applicable to fie
shipbuilding category. That is, the list does not include the word "shipyard,"
as it might have been expected to do. Accordingly, any area other than
a dry dock, building way or marine railway62 must bring itself within the
"other areas" catchall clause, and satisfy the qualifying phrase "customarily
used by an employer in... repairing, or building a vessel." The end result,
however, seems to be that any area or facility is covered if it can be said
to be within a shipyard.63
II. CoNs'u-tnoNAirY OF LANDwAED EXTENSION OF CovRAc
Treatment of the issue of constitutionality of the Act's 1972 landward
extension can take two forms - the short form or the long form. The short
form, which has been adopted by the Benefits Review Board, consists of
a demonstration that the Supreme Court has decided the question in ad-
vance, leaving no occasion for detailed analysis. The long form requires a
careful retracing of the development of the present doctrine of scope of
maritime power, as to both situs and status, followed by an examina-
tion of the possible backup role of the commerce power.
In Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law6 the Supreme Court had found it
necessary to hold that state law rather than the federal maritime law con-
trolled when an injury occurred on a dock as a result of an alleged defect
61. Id. at 379-80, citing Harris v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 Benefits Review
Board Serv. 301 (1975).
62. As to these terms, see 3 A. LAisoN, supra note 2, § 89.34.
63. See Luker v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 321
(1976) (area used for construction of units of vessels); Morgan v. Ingalls Shipbuilding
Corp., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 310 (1976) (shop used for fabrication of parts
to be used in ship construction and repair); Dubay v. FMC Marine & Rail Equip. Corp.
3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 43 (1975) (injury occurred in an area of
the employer's shipyard used for fabricating vessel segments); Kininess v. Alabama
Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 24 (1975)
(claimant sandblasting a crane in an area used for storage and maintenance of the
crane; the crane, in turn, was used in shipbuilding and repair); Maxin v. Dravo Corp.,
2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 372 (1975) (structural shop where components of
marine products were preassembled); Roberts v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 2 Benefits Review
Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 158 (1975) (injury occurred near the employer's dock building);
Mohamed v. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 85
(1975) ("slab area" where components for vessels were built).
64. 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
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in the employer's own forklift; therefore, under pre-1972 law an unsea-
worthiness action would not lie. The Court stressed heavily that, as the
law then stood, maritime law governed only those torts occurring on
navigable waters. But the Court added this dictum: "[11f denying federal
remedies to longshoremen injured on land is intolerable, Congress has
ample power under Arts. I and III of the constitution to enact a suitable
solution."65 The reference to these two Articles means, of course, that the
extension could be supported under both the commerce power and the
maritime power.
The Benefits Review Board, in Coppolino v. International Terminal
Operating Co.,6  its first opinion on the constitutional issue, quoted the
Victory Carriers passage and said that the constitutional question was
"easily disposed of" by reference to it. In the numerous subsequent
cases raising the constitutional argument, the Board has merely cited
Coppolino and said that the matter was settled for the reasons there
stated.67
In Coppolino, the Board added only one further citation, Wash-
ington v. W.C. Dawson & Co.,68 evidently to underline the residual
source of federal power inhering in the commerce clause. The Supreme
Court there said:
Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend, or revise
the maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its
will and judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment
of a general Employer's Liability Law or general provision for
compensating injured employees; .... Exercising another power-
to regulate commerce-Congress has prescribed the liability of
interstate carriers by railroad for damages to employees . . .
and thereby abrogated conflicting local rules. (citations omitted) 3
65. Id. at 216.
66. 1 Benefits Review Board Serv. 205 (1975). Recent decisions upholding the
constitutionality of the 1972 amendments include the following: Pittston Stevedoring
Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub non., Northeast
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1977); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 540 F 2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976); Jackionville
Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub
nom., P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976) (No. 76-641);
Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed,
45 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1976) (No. 76-571).
67. See, e.g., Perez v. United Terminals, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 368,
370 (1976); Luker v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 321, 325(1976); Morgan v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 310, 313(1976); Cabrera v. Maher Terminals, Inc, 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 297, 3(10(1976); Santumo v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 262, 267(1976); Scafiddi v. Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 47, 49(1975); Blundo v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. 376, 380 (1975); Maxdn v. Dravo Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 372,
375 (1975).
68. 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
69. Id. at 227-28.
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The Board concludes:
Thus, the Supreme Court has already made clear that there
is congressional authority for the extensions of jurisdiction in the
longshoring and shipbuilding industries both via its maritimejurisdiction and its power to regulate commerce.70
However, a more exhaustive analysis of the constitutional problem is
in order, for two reasons. First, as a glance at the list of cases raising the
issue will show, the constitutional attack promises to form an almost
routine segment of the defense of borderline cases, until the matter is
ultimately put to rest by the Supreme Court. Second, there is a definite
interplay between concepts of constitutionality and the breadth or narrow-
ness with which the scope of the act will be interpreted, both as to situs
and as to status. A court whose view of the constitutional power is relatively
narrow may well apply a narrow statutory interpretation, in order to keep
within constitutional bounds. Conversely, a court with a broad view of
the reach of federal constitutional power will feel more readily disposed
to indulge in a broad reading of the statutory language, uninhibited by
constitutional worries.
Under what might be called the traditional concept of maritime
power, the extension of the Longshoremen's Act to such landward areas
as piers, wharves, terminals, marine railways, building ways, and ship-
building yards would have been held unconstitutional. A long line of cases
had held piers, docks, wharves and the like to be extensions of the land
and hence subject to state, not federal, jurisdiction.71 Another long line
of cases had held that new ship construction, as distinguished from ship
repair, fell within local acts.72 At the same time, the Supreme Court
was expressing the character of this division of jurisdiction in uncompro-
mising terms. In Crowell v. Benson,73 for example, the Court said, in the
course of sustaining the constitutionality of the Longshoremen's Act:
70. Coppolino v. International Terminal Operating Co., 1 Benefits Review Board
Serv. 205, 210-11 (1975).
71. Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 7 (1946); Minnie v. Port Huron
Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647, 648-49 (1935); T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179,
181 (1928); State Indus. Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1922);
Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316, 321 (1908);
The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1866); Houser v. O'Leary 383 F.2d 730,
731-32 (9th Cir. 1967); Johnston v. Marshall, 128 F.2d 13, 14-15 19th Cir.), curt.
denied, 317 U.S. 629 (1942); Stansbury v. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 159 So. 2d
728, 729 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
72. John Baley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222, 230-31 (1930); Robins Dry
Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449, 457 (1925); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Neuman, 318 F. Supp. 398, 400-01 (S.D. Ala. 1969); La Casse v. Great Lakes
Eng'r Works, 242 Mich. 454, 219 N.W. 730, 734 (1928) (containing thorough analysla
of Supreme Court cases in point); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 351 S.W.2d 374
376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Messel v. Foundation Co. 274
U.S. 427 (1927); Seeler v. Otis Elevator Co., 281 App. Div. 140, 120 N.Y.S.2d 325(1952).
73. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See general discussion of this case and the doctrine of
"constitutional fact" at 3 A. LAISON, supra note 2, § 80.42. See also Larson, The Doc-
trine of "Constitutional Fact," 15 TEMP. L.Q. 185 (1941).
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These fundamental requirements are that the injury occurs
upon the navigable waters of the United States and that the rela-
tion of master and servant exists. These conditions are indispens-
able to the application of the statute, not only because the Con-
gress has so provided explicitly, but also because the power of the
Congress to enact the legislation turns upon the existence of these
conditions.74
And if any doubt could remain after such a statement, the Court goes
on to drive the point home with specific reference to the navigable waters
requirement:
In amending and revising the maritime law, the Congress
cannot reach beyond the constitutional limits which are inherent
in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Unless the injuries to
which the act relates occur upon the navigable waters of the
United States, they fall outside that jurisdiction. 5
The first sentence of the excerpt immediately above contains a reminder
of a fact that is easy to overlook, in view of the long acceptance of
the power of Congress to amend the admiralty law. This is the fact that
the Constitution contains no direct conferral of express power on Congress
to legislate as to maritime matters. What the Constitution does do is to
extend the judicial power to admiralty and maritime causes: 'The judicial
Power shall extend... to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.""
Nevertheless, it has been accepted throughout history, and in innu-
merable cases,77 that the Constitution impliedly granted this power to
Congress.m For present purposes, this absence of a fixed constitutional
clause may help in part to explain why both the courts and the Congress
have felt unusually free to alter maritime law to meet the needs of the
times. It was only two years after the brassbound rigidity of Crowell that
the Supreme Court uttered the following manifesto of flexibility in The
Thomas Barlum:79
The authority of the Congress to enact legislation of this
nature was not limited by previous decisions as to the extent of
the admiralty jurisdiction. We have had abundant reason to realize
that our experience and new conditions give rise to new concep-
tions of maritime concerns. These may require that former
criteria of jurisdiction be abandoned, as, for example, they were
abandoned in discarding the doctrine that the admiralty juris-
diction was limited to tidewaters."0
74. 285 U.S. at 54-55.
75. Id. at 55.
76. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 2.
77. See cases cited in 1A BEmicr ON ADNmuLTY § 91, 5-4 n.10 (7th rev. ed.
1975).
78. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959);
The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934).
79. 293 U.S. 21 (1934).
80. Id. at 52.
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Any number of illustrations could be cited, both before and after
Crowell, and both related and unrelated to the Longshoremen's Act,
of stretching maritime jurisdiction here and bending it there.
As far back as 1884, Congress passed an act81 extending admiralty
jurisdiction shoreward, to include damages by a vessel to a land structure.
Furthermore, in 1948 a more comprehensive Admiralty Extension Act 82
was adopted, covering all cases of damage and injury to persons or prop-
erty caused by a vessel on navigable waters even if that injury or damage
was done or consummated on land.
The Supreme Court in Crowell appeared to disregard as inconsequen-
tial the statutory extension of the concept of navigable waters to include
"any dry dock." Yet, all kinds of high-and-dry marine and building ways,"
not to mention the dry land surrounding them,84 have been brought within
the term "dry dock." When the Supreme Court itself affirmed per curiam
a case in which a marine railway 400 feet from the waterline was held
covered as a "dry dock,"85 it was becoming evident that the traditional
doctrines containing the navigable waters concept were crumbling badly.
To move from this broadly construed "dry dock" to the lengthened list of
waterfront areas inserted in 1972 between the same pair of parentheses
was thus to appear more as a change in degree than as a conceptual break-
through.
By far the most significant enlargement of the admiralty domain for
present purposes, however, was the development of the principle that mari-
time character could attach to a particular episode, not merely through
the situs of the injury, but through the maritime nature of the injured
worker's employment - no matter where he was when injured." The lead-
ing case was O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,87 decided in
1943, holding that the Jones Act applied to inland injuries if they were in
the course of a seaman's employment and were related to the ship's activi-
ties. A similar test was applied to the remedy of maintenance and cure in
the same year.8
As long as the Longshoremen's Act was bounded exclusively by a situs
rule, there was of course no way of importing this principle into the Long-
shoremen's Act conflicts area. But in 1972, Congress explicitly injected
81. Act of June 26, 1884, ch. 121, § 18, 23 Stat. 57.
82. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). The constitutionality of the Admiralty Extension
Act was upheld in United States v. Matson Navigation Co., 201 F.2d 610, 016 (9th
Cir. 1953). This act was applied by the Supreme Court in Cutierrez v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
83. See 3 A. LtnsoN, supra note 2, § 89.34.
84. Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369,
372-73 (5th Cir. 1962).
85. Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 201 F.2d 437, 438 (5th Cir.),
affd per curiam, 346 U.S. 366 (1953).
86. For a more detailed discussion of the evolution and elaboration of this prin-
ciple, see 3 A. LASON, supra note 2, § 90.27.
87. 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
88. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 736-37 (1943).
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a maritime employment test into the Longshoremen's Act by beginning
its definition of the term "employee" with these words: "The term 'employee'
means any person engaged in maritime employment . . . .,19 The result
was to transplant bodily the entire "maritime employment" doctrine of
O'DonnelU and subsequent cases into the Longshoremen's area, still subject,
however, to a situs limitation that has no counterpart in the Jones Act.
Within that limitation, the maritime power under the Longshoremen's Act
enjoys all the affirmative reach built up by the Jones Act cases. For present
purposes, there is no substantial distinction between the two acts so far
as constitutional issues are concerned."'
It need only be added that old distinctions such as that between
shipbuilding and ship repairing have no contemporary relevance to
determining what "maritime employment" can be constitutionally covered.
Specifically, the old notion that new ship construction was inherently
nonmaritime was demolished once and for all by Calbeck, when it decreed
Longshoremen's Act coverage of two welders working on a new vessel float-
ing on navigable waters.91
It was noted at the threshold of this discussion of constitutionality that
the Supreme Court had, in effect, given its blessing in advance to the use
of the commerce power, if necessary to support landward extension of
longshoremen's remedies.9- At the same point, a supporting quotation
from the 1924 Supreme Court case was adduced.
It is a truism of constitutional law that, if Congress could have accom-
plished a particular result under any of its constitutional powers, the consti-
tutionality of that result will be upheld even if the power apparently
relied on - for example, admiralty, in this instance - should prove to
fall short.94
This use of the commerce and maritime powers in tandem is nothing
new. As early as 1851, the Supreme Court held that the admiralty power
could not be narrowed by invoking limitations on the commerce power."'
By 1884 it was accepted that the commerce power and the admiralty power
were parallel sources of congressional authority to legislate as to naviga-
tion, with the one source being used in some instances and the other in
89. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, § 2(3), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 902(3) (Supp. 1976).
90. It may be added that a similar expansion took place in the landward exten-
sion of the unseaworthiness remedy. See, e.g., Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331
F.2d 657, 659 (3d Cir. 1964); Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp.
812, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
91. 370 U.S. 114, 116 (1962).
92. Refer to text accompanyin note 65 supra. For the view that Congress in the
1972 amendments did not rely on le commerce power, but used its maritime power
to the full extent see Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation
Programs, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976).
93. Refer to text accompanying note 66 supra.
94. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
95. The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 452-53(1851).
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others. The Supreme Court in the landmark O'Donnell case observed that
remedies for seamen were derivative both from the commerce power and
from the "necessary and proper" clause as applied to the execution of Con-
gress' admiralty power.9
It is abundantly clear, then, that if some residual constitutional power
were thought necessary to make up for any deficiency in today's broad
maritime powers (which seems unlikely), that residual power could be
found in the authority to regulate commerce.
III. TnE "ST xTus TE ST": MAmnmrrn EMPLOYMENT
Before 1972, coverage of the Longshoremen's Act turned exclusively
on situs of injury, and that situs in turn was strictly bounded by navigable
waters.97 In 1972, in order to get away from the undesirable effects of
having longshoremen and harbor workers popping in and out of the federal
act with every gangplank crossing, the situs test was enlarged to embrace
terminals, piers, and other areas adjoining navigable waters and used for
loading, unloading, building and repairing ships.98 If the amendments had
stopped there, however, the expansion of coverage would have seriously
overshot the mark. The reason was that, before 1972, any employee injured
on navigable waters was under the Act, however unrelated to longshoring
or other waterfront activities his regular work might be. For example, let
us suppose the case of a railway brakeman whose work occasionally takes
him into a marine terminal. We will suppose also that the railway is a
covered employer by virtue of having some true maritime employees."0
While in the terminal, the brakeman asks to see Joe, a stevedoring super-
visor, and is told that Joe is on a ship lying at the dock. The brakeman
goes onto the ship to look for Joe, and falls into an open hatchway. Before
1972, the brakeman would have been clearly under the Longshoremen's
Act.
Now, the number of cases in which railway workers, outside truckers,
deliverymen, and others crossed onto navigable waters in such circumstances
as these was perhaps not large enough to cause major concern before 1972.
But when the covered situs was expanded to include entire terminal and
shipbuilding areas, it became obvious that some additional limitation had
to be superimposed to prevent coverage of every trucker or railway worker
that entered a terminal and every local materials supplier or service man
that entered a shipyard.
The solution chosen was to place a special limitation on the defini-
tion of employee:
96. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943).97. See Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 312 (1969); Calbeck v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
98. Refer to note 12 supra.
99. Refer to note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged
in ngshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship
repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not
include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net. 00
The addition of the status test thus had both an expansive and a con-
strictive purpose and effect. The expansive effect was to ensure the consti-
tutionality of the landward expansion of the situs test, as shown in the
discussion in the subsection immediately above.
The constrictive effect was to exclude from coverage various nonmari-
time workers who before 1972, like the railway brakeman, might have
found themselves within the Longshoremen's Act through the sheer accident
of having been upon navigable waters at the time of injury. The curious
idea that everyone covered before 1972 must have been covered after
1972, once espoused by the Benefits Review Board, was exploded by the
Ninth Circuit in Gilmore, as shown earlier.10 1 The Fourth Circuit also ad-
dressed itself to this point in I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board:10
The pre-1972 Act thus did not distinguish among employ-
ees depending on the function they performed. Instead, the geo-
graphical location of the injury was all-important, with coverage
stopping at the water's edge.
Sections 2 and 3 of the present Act establish a dual test for
coverage. The situs requirement has been retained, with the defini-
tion of "navigable waters" expanded to include certain specified
land areas. In addition, a new "status" test has been added: the
person injured ("employee") must have been engaged in "maritime
employment," a concept which is nowhere defined but which in-
cludes "longshoring operations." The net effect of the 1972 Amend-
ments was therefore to broaden the area in which an injury would
be covered, and narrow the class of persons eligible according to
job function."0 3
IV. LoNCsHOasmu : "Po=I OF REST" VERSUS "ARTnImE Co- DmCE" THEORY
The first major controversy to appear touching the scope of longshor-
ing activities covered by the amended act can best be described as a con-
test between the point of rest theory and the in maritime commerce theory.
By early 1977 four circuits (First, Second, Third, and Fifth) had rejected
100. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 2(3), 33 U.S.C.A.
j 902(3) (Supp. 1976).
101. Reer to text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
102. 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), modificd on rehearing, 542 F.2d 903 (1976)(en banc), petitionjfor cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No. 76-730).
103. 529 F.2d at 1083.
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the "point of rest" test, while one (Fourth) was divided on the question.1 4
The two theories and their supporting arguments are well presented
in the original majority and dissenting opinion in the I.T.O. case decided by
the 4th Circuit late in 1975 but modified by the court en bane in 1976.
In the majority opinion, written by Judge Winter, and concurred in
by Chief Judge Haynsworth, the point of rest doctrine, adopted by the
court, is summarized at the beginning of the opinion in the following words:
We conclude that the Act's benefits extend only to those
persons, including checkers, who unload cargo from the ship to the
first point of rest at the terminal or load cargo from the last point
of rest at the terminal to the ship.105
Judge Craven, dissenting, provides an excellent working summary of
the maritime commerce theory, favored by the Benefits Review Board, by
identifying six general positions adopted by the Board:
Repeatedly and consistently the Board has emphasized:
(1) Outright rejection of the "point of rest" theory as a deter-
minative factor in cases where coverage is disputed.
(2) Waterborne cargo remains in maritime commerce until
such time as it is delivered to a trucker or other carrier to be taken
from the terminal for further transshipment.
(3) Cargo first enters maritime commerce when it is unloaded
from a truck or other carrier and is handled by terminal employees
working upon the "navigable waters" of the United States as
defined in the Act.
(4) The "loading and unloading" of ships is a continuous
process involving many different employees working at various
places within the terminal area and performing different tasks,
but includes the handling of cargo during all times it is in mari-
time commerce.
(5) It is sufficient to bring an employee within the scope
of maritime employment that his duties at the time of injury in-
volved handling cargo that is in maritime commerce.
(6) The Act does not require that one actually be engaged in
loading or unloading vessels to be an "employee' within the mean-
ing of the Act.106
104. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. granted sub nom., Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1977);
I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976) (en bane)
modifying 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975)- Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976); Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub norn., P.C.
Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976) (No. 76-641); Stockman
v. John T. Clark & Son, 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45
U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1976) (No. 76-571).
105. 529 F.2d at 1081.
106. Id. at 1092-93.
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It hardly needs to be stressed that the outcome of this controversy will
have far-reaching effects on the coverage of thousands of waterfront work-
ers, and on the extent to which the 1972 amendments succeed in achieving
their announced goal of a unified system of compensation for waterfront
workers. The best way to approach this important issue is to appraise in
some detail the arguments of the majority and dissent in the ITO case.
The case was obviously very exhaustively briefed and argued by counsel
for the numerous parties 0 7 and others who appeared amicus curiae, and
the two opinions seem to contain most of the arguments that could be
marshalled on either side.
The exact nature of the facts is of some importance in understanding
the significance of this case. Three employees, having somewhat different
duties, were involved. The employer's terminal operation was a very large
one, as a result of which the total process of moving cargo from a land-
based truck to a ship was segmented into several specialized movements.
Roughly, there appeared to be four such possible segments. First, the goods
would be moved, often by forklift, from the truck or rail car that had
brought them to the terminal, and would be placed in a warehouse. Second,
a forklift operator (in this case, the plaintiff Brown) would pick up, as
here, cotton piece goods and barrels of chemicals from the warehouse in
which they had been deposited after delivery by truck or rail. He moved
these items to a container which was then "stuffed," that is, loaded.
The third segment occurred when the fully loaded container was
picked up by another vehicle called a "hustler" and moved to a marshaling
area adjacent to the pier. There the container was stacked with other con-
tainers to await loading on the ship. Plaintiff Harris in this case operated a
"hustler." Finally, the fourth stage was the actual loading of the cargo
onto the ship.
Plaintiff, Adkins, performed the function here described as the first
segment, except in reverse. He was injured while moving a load of brass
tubing from storage in a warehouse to a delivery truck waiting to transport
the goods to their final destination.
Note that all of these operations were performed within the terminal,
so that there was no question, as the court promptly points out, but that
the situs test was satisfied, even though the shed where Adkins was working
was 685 feet from the water line, and the warehouse where Brown worked
was 850 feet from water. Conversely, none of these employees apparently
107. At least 45 employers were parties, not to mention associations and carriers.
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ever boarded a ship or physically placed goods on a ship.0 8
Because of the capsulized character of these sequential operations
the court assumed that it was possible to deal with the case free of the
complications that might have been present if the employees had had a
greater or lesser admixture of unmistakably covered activity in their duties-
as, for example, by sometimes boarding a ship or helping with an actual
shiploading operation.
The majority first approached the problem by trying to extract an
answer from the intrinsic meaning of the key words in the definition: "Mari-
time employment," 'longshoreman," and "persons engaged in longshoring
operations." The court concluded that this approach could not yield a
definitive answer. As to the term "maritime employment," the court first
sets out the traditional rule:
"Maritime employment" is a phrase that embodies the con-
cept of a direct relation to a vessel's navigation and commerce.
Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 61, 34 S.Ct. 733,
735, 58 L. Ed. 1208 (1914) ("The libellant was injured on a ship,
lying in navigable waters, and while he was engaged in the per-
formance of a maritime service. We entertain no doubt that the
service in loading and stowing a ship's cargo is of this character.")100
But the court then explains why these early generalizations do not set-
tle the current issue:
But while the cases establish that loading and unloading a
vessel is maritime employment, they all limited (sic) recovery
to injuries sustained on the seaward side of the water's edge
because such was the limit of admiralty jurisdiction. See discussion
and collection of authorities in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404
U.S. 202, 204-07, 92 S. Ct. 418, 30 L. Ed.2d 383 (1971). Thus the
cases shed no real light on how far shoreward the maritime nature
of loading and unloading extends, particularly where as here,
the shore-based aspects of the overall loading and unloading opera-
tions have been split into numerous functions assigned to different
employees." 0
108. One discovers late in the majority's opinion, in a footnote, that this was.
not quite entirely so:
We are aware that Adkins testified that in the past, and sometimes over
weekends, he was employed in various capacities "loading and unloading
ships" and "on a ship." We think that the record is clear, however, that Adldns
was not so employed at the time he was injured; rather his duties were con-
fined to operating a forklift in Shed 11. As we have indicated in the text, the
status of his employment is to be determined as of the time of the accident-
not by what his previous duties may have been or by what his duties are
when he accepts sporadic overtime assignments.
Id. at 1088 n.4.
The court's resort to the device of making the position at the time of accident
control is criticized in detail at text accompanying note 133 infra.
109. 529 F.2d at 1084.
110. Id.
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The court next looks for guidance in the words "longshoreman" and
"longshoring operations," and finds the result inconclusive this time because
of a disagreement among the sources of law. The court concedes that a
Second Circuit case might seem to support the broader interpretation of
longshoring:
It is true that in Intercontinental Container Transport Corp.
v. New York Shipping Assn, 426 F.2d 884 (2 Cir. 1970), it was said
that "[h]istorically the work of longshoremen included the prepara-
tion of cargo for shipment by making up, for example, drafts and
pallets and, in connection with unloading cargo, the breaking up
of drafts and pallets, sorting the cargo according to its consignees
and delivering it to the trucks or other carriers." Id. at 886. At
the same time, however, the opinion recognized that "[tjhe work
of stevedores is the loading and unloading of ships," id. at 889.111
But the majority set off against this case a regulation of the Secretary
of Labor embodying a narrower definition of "longsboring":
Perhaps more significant is the fact that the Secretary of
Labor, in promulgating regulations to foster safe conditions in the
longshoring industry, defined longshoring operations" as the "load-
ing, unloading, moving or handling of cargo, ship's stores, geaY,
etc., into, in, on, or out of any vessel on the navigable waters of
the United States." 29 C.F.R. § 1918.3(i) (1974) (emphasis added).
See 29 C.F.R § 1910.16(b) (1) (1974).12
At this point the court makes no further attempt to marshal authorities
on the meaning of these crucial words, since its main purpose has been
satisfied: to demonstrate that the meaning of the words themselves is suffi-
ciently uncertain to require resort to legislative history in the search for
what Congress really meant by them.
Because we conclude that the terms "maritime employment,"
"longshoreman" and "longshoring operations" are not such words
of art that we would be justified in deciding the case without
resort to the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments and full
consideration of the context in which they were enacted, we turn
to these secondary sources. (citations omitted)113
As we shall see in a moment, the reason for the court's haste to get on
111. Id.
112. Id. The court follows this with a recognition of a possible line of attack
on this source:
Of course these regulations were adopted prior to enactment of the 1972
Amendments and it may well.be, as the government argues, that they will
ultimately be redrafted when the scope of the 1972 Amendments has beenjudicially determined. They are significant evidence, however, of the meaning
attached to the words at the time that Congress was considering the 1972
Amendments.
113. Id. at 1084-85.
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to legislative history was that its strongest argument lay in some morsels
of that history. For exactly the same reason, Judge Craven was equally
anxious to prove that the meaning of the operative words was sufficiently
clear to make resort to legislative history unnecessary and inappropriate.
He himself leaves no doubt about this:
The basic disagreement between myself and my brothers is
whether or not resort to the legislative history was necessary at all
in these cases. My brothers feel that the language of the 1972
amendments is ambiguous, and they accordingly embark upon
their search for congresgional purpose and intent citing as authority
United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648, 81 S.Ct. 1278, 6
L.Ed.2d 575 (1961). I find no such ambiguity and note that the
operative sentence in the Oregon case cited by my brethren reads
as follows: "Having concluded that the provisions of [the statute]
are clear and unequivocal on their face, we find no need to resort
to the legislative history of the Act." 366 U.S. at 648, 81 S. Ct. at
1281.114
Accordingly, Judge Craven musters an impressive array of cases,""
in addition to the single case cited by the majority, supporting his position
that the concept of longshoring or 'loading and unloading" of ships extends
to cargo handling beyond the "point of rest." He examines the facts of ten
cases in detail and quotes at length from several of them. Thus, in Litwino-
wicz v. Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co.,' 6 a case involving work performed
inside a railway car to prepare steel beams for unloading onto a pier, the
court said:
The term loading is not a word of art, and is not to be nar-
rowly and hypertechnically interpreted. Plaintiffs' actions at the
time of the accident were direct, necessary steps in the physical
transfer of the steel from the railroad car into the vessel, which
constituted the work of loading." 7
Judge Craven tops his list of precedents with an opinion from the
Fourth Circuit itself in Garrett v. Gutzeit.n 8 The plaintiff's job there was
to take bales off of hand trucks inside a pier shed and stack them. This
was held to be an integral part of the "unloading" process. The court
specifically rejected the narrower view:
114. Id. at 1094.
115. Carratt v. Cutzeit, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974)- Law v. Victory Carriers,
Inc., 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 202 (1971);
Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964); Hagans v. Ellerman
& Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963); Byrd v. American Export Isbrandtsen
Lines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Olvera v. Michalos, 307 F. Su pp. 9
(S.D. Tex. 1968); Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.
Pa. 1959).
116. 179 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
117. Id. at 817-18.
118. 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974).
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The [district] court apparently concluded that "unloading"
ceases when the cargo is no longer in contact with the ship, i.e.,
when the bales were deposited on the pier and discharged from the
ship's gear. Although we find this theory appealing because of its
ease of application, we believe that the case law rejects such a
narrow definition of "unloading.'1 9
It then makes the operative test turn on whether the particular activity
was a necessary part of the unloading operation:
We, however, are guided by the historical development of
the warranty rather than by arbitrary definitions of admittedly
amorphous terms . . . . The record in the instant case demon-
strates that it was necessary to move the bales away from the
side of the ship as they were discharged from the ship's qear so
that additional bales could be unloaded. It was, therefore, a neces-
sary step in the unloading operation."'0
Judge Craven presents a number of other arguments for stopping
short of examining legislative history, but for various reasons they do not
constitute his strongest case . 2'
One may now pick up the thread of the majority's argument to discover
the principal reason for their decision. The court traces the torturous history
of coverage of waterfront injuries, up to the point at which the Supreme
Court, in Nacirema and Victory Carriers, pointed out that any landward
extension of the act would have to come from Congress. The court then
proceeded to quote at length from the virtually identical House and Senate
119. Id. at 234. This language was quoted in the I.T.O. case. 529 F.2d at 1100.
120. 491 F.2d at 236. This was also quoted in the I.T.O. case. 529 F.2d at 1100.
121. The first is the routine maxim, amply supported by authorities, that the
Act should be liberally construed. This maxim, however, has seldom outweighed the
kind of specific evidence of legislative intent that the majority believed it found in
the congressional reports.
The second broad argument is invocation of the statutory presumption of coverage
in § 20 of the Act. See 1 A. LARoN, supra note 2, § 10.33 for a discussion of the
problems involved in attempting to apply this presumption literally.
The third preliminary argument is that interpretations of a statute by an agency
charged with its enforcement are entitled to great deference. judge Craven lists 32
decisions of the Benefits Review Board supporting his interpretation. Many of these,
as well as similar later decisions, are examined infra. It may be questioned whether
this familiar principle applies to a quasi-judicial body charged, not with administration
of a specialized program, but with the settling of disputes between private litigants.
The principle itself rests on the idea that an a mimstra~tive commission dealing with a
technical area is more competent than a general court to pass on certain specialized
questions within its competence. But the Benefits Review Board is not staffed by
persons selected for their waterfront experience. They also have to deal with matters
affecting the District of Columbia Act, the Black Lung Act, and so on. They are in
this respect no different from the typical workmen's compensation board reviewing
decisions of referees and examiners. As such their findings of fact are entitled to the
usual deference, but traditionally their findings of law are not-and the issue here
is one of law, in the form of a question of statutory interpretation.
The same comment applies to Judge Craven's fourth point, which is that the
scope of review of a Benefits Review Board decision should be narrow. However that
may be, it obviously cannot be so narrow as to relieve the court of the duty to correct
an error of law in the form of an incorrect construction of a statute-if that is indeed
what was at stake.
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reports122 accompanying the 1972 amendments. 123
The first excerpt cited by the court as damaging to plaintiffs' conten-
tion was one that seemed to limit post-1972 coverage to workers who prior
to 1972 would have been covered as to part of their activities:
It [the Committee] said its intent was to provide benefits to
employees "who would otherwise be covered by this Act for part
of their activity" (emphasis added). As an example, it cited em-
ployees who unload cargo from a ship and transport it "immedi-
122. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
123. H.R. R .No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972) reads as follows:
The present Act, insofar as longshoremen and ship builders and repairmen
are concerned, covers only injuries which occur "upon the navigable waters
of the United States." Thus, coverage of the present Act stops at the water's
edge; injuries occurring on land are covered by State Workmen's Compensa-
tion laws. The result is a disparity in benefits payable for death or disability
for the same type of injury depending on which side of the water's edge and
in which State the accident occurs.
It is apparent that if the Federal benefit structure embodied in Committee
bill is enacted there would be a substantial disparity in benefits payable to ,a
permanently disabled longshoreman, depending on which side of the waters
edge the accident occurred, if State laws are permitted to continue to apply
to injuries occurring on land. It is also to be noted that with the advent of
modem cargo handling techniques, such as containerization and the use of
LASH-type vessels, more of the longshoremens work is performed on land
than heretofore.
The Committee believes that the compensation payable to a longshoreman
or a ship repairman or builder should not depend on the fortuitous circum-
stance of whether the injury occurred on land or over water. Accordingly, the
bill would amend the Act to provide coverage of longshoremen, harbor
workers ship repairmen, ship builders shipbreakers, and other employees
engaged in maritime employment (excluding masters and members of the
crew of a vessel) if the injury occurred either upon the navigable waters of
the United States or any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building
way marine railway, or other area adjoining such navigable waters customarily
used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel.
The intent of the Committee is to permit a uniform compensation system
to apply to employees who would otherwise be covered by this Act for part
of their activity. To take a typical example, cargo, whether in break bulk or
containerized form, is typically unloaded from the ship and immediately
transported to a storage or holding area on the pier, wharf, or terminal adjoin-
ing navigable waters. The employees who perform this work would be cov-
ered under the bill for injuries sustained by them over the navigable waters
or on the adjoining land area. The Committee does not intend to cover
employees who are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building
a vessel, just because they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters
used for such activity. Thus, employees whose responsibility is only to pick
up stored cargo for further transshipment would not be covered, nor would
purely clerical employees whose jobs do not require them to participate in
the loading or unloading of cargo. However, checkers, for example, who are
directly involved in the loading or unloading functions are covered by the
new amendment. Likewise the Committee has no intention of extending cover-
age under the Act to individuals who are not employed by a person who is
an employer, i.e. a person at least some of whose employees are engaged in
whole or in part, in some form of maritime employment. Thus, an indvidual
employed by a person none of whose employees work, in whole or in part,
on navigable waters, is not covered even if injured on a pier adjoining navi-
gable waters.
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ately ... to a storage or holding area on the pier, wharf, or terminal
adjoining navigable waters." U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972,
p. 4708. Such employees were to be compensated if they were
injured over navigable waters or on the adjoining land area. Con-
versely, employees not engaged in loading or unloading a vessel
were not to be covered even if they were injured on land in an
area used for such activity.24
But the most damaging passage was still to come:
The report specifically stated that "employees whose responsi-
bility is only to pick up stored cargo for further transshipment
would not be covered" (emphasis added), nor would purely cleri-
cal employees who do not participate in the loading and unloading
of cargo. However, checkers "directly involved in the loading and
unloading functions" (emphasis added) would be eligible for bene-
fits. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, p. 4708.125
It can now be plainly seen why the majority were impatient to get
to legislative history, while Judge Craven was anxious to avoid it.
The court does not hesitate to press home its advantage, and announce
its "point of rest" formula:
We especially note that the committee report is explicit in
delineating the portion of the overall loading and unloading pro-
cess during which coverage attaches to longshoremen and persons
engaged in longshoring operations: the Act applies between the
ship and, in the case of unloading, the first storage or holding area
on the pier, wharf, or terminal adjoining navigable waters. Al-
though the instance of loading a ship was not discussed, we think
that the same principle controls in reverse: coverage is afforded
from the last storage or holding area on the pier, etc., to the ship.
We perceive the landward limit of coverage to be the "point of
rest" as that term is generally understood in the industry, Norfolk
Marine Terminal Association Tariff, No. 1-C at 18, Item 290,
Respondent's Exhibit 1, Harris v. Marine Terminals, Inc., No. 74-
LHCA-108 (Aug. 15, 1974), and defined by the Federal Maritime
Commission in its regulations governing terminal operators. 46
C.F.R. § 533.6(c) (1974). See also American President Lines, Ltd.
v. Federal Maritime Bd., 115 U.S. App. D.C. 187, 37 F.2d 887, 888
(1962); DiPaola v. International Terminal Operation Co., 311
F.Supp. 685, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).126
Judge Craven, having amassed a number of arguments why legislative
history should never have been resorted to in the first place, finally
attacks the relied-on passages directly. His principal argument is that the
language of the report is at best ambiguous, and could equally well be
interpreted as intended to exclude truck drivers and others who pick up
cargo for transshipment and delivery beyond the terminal:





The sentence in the House Report thought crucial by the
majority reads as follows: "Thus, employees whose responsibility
is only to pick up stored cargo for further transshipment would
not be covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose jobs
do not require them to participate in the loading or unloading of
cargo." U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, p. 4708. I think they
read more into the sentence than is there. In the first place, over-
the-road and local truck drivers who come to a terminal to pick
up cargo for further transshipment would certainly not be covered
for several reasons: (a) ordinarily they are at the outer perimeter
of the terminal and not on "navigable water," [footnote omitted]
(b) usually truck drivers, certainly ff unionized, never load their
trucks; they only drive them. The sentence from the House Report
is inartful, and seems to mean that neither clerical workers nor
truck drivers picking up shipments are covered and for the same
reason: neither category of workers have anything to do with the
loading or unloading of cargo. The wording in the House Report
just quoted cannot be so broadly construed so as to exclude from
coverage those workers who (1) work on the "navigable waters"
and (2) must directly handle cargo in the overall process of loading
and unloading ships.127
Judge Craven then notes that the "point of rest" terminology, although
it turns up in such places as Maritime Commission regulations, was never
written into the amendments or expressly applied to this act, either in
the legislative history or in the literature analyzing it. If such a sharply
limiting definition had been intended, reasons Judge Craven, surely it
would have appeared somewhere in the record in unequivocal form. He
adds a practical point:
Counsel for appellants have conceded, both in their briefs
and in oral argument, that the location of the "point of rest" will
vary from port to port, depending upon the sophistication of each
port's cargo-handling facilities. The definitions relied upon by
the majority, moreover, would grant to the terminal operator
power to shift unilaterally the "point of rest" seaward or shoreward
at his whim or caprice."
In other words, not every longshoring operation is as neatly divided
into segments as those at the huge ITO terminal. What happens in small
operations when longshoremen are in and out of the four different seg-
ments identified at the outset?
When all the arguments are in, and all the supporting materials have
been deployed on both sides - judicial precedents, administrative holdings,
legislative history, texts, articles, maritime regulations, maxims, and pre-
sumptions - the most telling point of all may well be Judge Craven's
straightforward observation that, if the majority is right, then Congress
simply has not accomplished what it set out to achieve: to replace the
127. Id. at 1095.
128. Id. at 1096.
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pre-1972 in-and-out patchwork of coverage by a simplified and uniform
system of compensation. Judge Craven sounds this theme in the opening
sentences of his dissent:
William T. Adkins, Donald D. Brown, and Vernie Lee Harris
will, I think, be surprised to learn that they are not longshoremen,
and astonished to discover that they are not engaged in maritime
employment of any kind. If they are not, as my brothers hold,
then the Congress has labored prodigiously only to have accom-
plished nothing at all in its effort to simplify the problems of mari-
time workers' compensation. While these cases are the first to
reach a court of appeals under the 1972 amendments to the Act,
[footnote omitted] they will surely not be the last. Henceforth,
injured employees and their counsel must comb the waterfronts of
this circuit, probing hopelessly, like Diogenes with his lantern,
for the elusive "point of rest" upon which coverage depends.2
Later in his dissent, Judge Craven develops this argument further by
showing that it amounts to a second situs test:
If the "point of rest" theory remains wedged between the lines
of the LHWCA, the result can only be to erect yet another "situs"
requirement for coverage. Once the initial "situs" test is satisfied,
i.e., it is determined that a worker is injured on "navigable waters"
as defined by the Act, the only remaining inquiry should be wheth-er his employment is "maritime." A worker's "status," i.e., whether
he is engaged in maritime employment, should be determined bythe nature of his work, and not where e performs it. Yet, the
"point of rest" theory, adopted by the or mr eans that workers
performing the same function, handling the same cargo, will be
treated differently depending upon where they work even though
they are all working on the premises of a terminal conceded to be
within the Act's definition of "navigable waters." It was precisely
this anomaly, where workers exposed to identical risks receive dis-
parate workmen's compensation benefits, which provided the impe-
tus for the 1972 amendments. Thus, the majority effectively holds
that the Congress has failed in its efforts to correct a bad situation,
and that coverage even yet depends upon a fictional location-point
of rest-that has no relation whatever to the inherent risks of em-
ployment. 130
These "inherent risks," Judge Craven stresses, involving the typical
machinery and other apparatus involved in waterfront activities, are no
respecters of lines drawn by reference to "points of rest." Accordingly, he
argues, the boundaries of coverage should follow lines related to the purpose
and function of the Act, rather than related to conceptual theories about
what is or is not "maritime."
129. Id. at 1089.
130. Id. at 1096-97.
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The I.T.O. case was reheard en bane before six judges. By a vote of
4 to 2, the decision of the Benefits Review Board awarding benefits to
Adkins was reversed. The decisions of the Board granting benefits to Brown
and Harris were affirmed by an equally divided vote. The "swing vote"
was that of Judge Widener. Judge Russell joined Chief Judge Haynsworth
and Judge Winter in voting for reversing the Board in all three cases.
Judge Butzner joined Judge Craven in voting to affirm the Board in all
three cases. Judge Butzner wrote a brief opinion in which he said:
I fully agree with Judge Craven that the point of rest theory
espoused by the majority of the court is a judicial gloss on the
1972 Amendments of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, which is warranted by neither the Act nor its
legislative history.130.'
Judge Widener did not write his own separate opinion, but his views
were summarized in Judge Winter's opinion:
On the issue of the extent of the Act's coverage, Chief Judge
Haynsworth, Judge Russell and I subscribe to the views expressed
in the majority panel decision. Judge Widener subscribes to the
principle expressed in that opinion, although he defines the exact
point between coverage and non-coverage somewhat differently.
In his application of the principle, Judge Widener concludes
that the claimant Adkins is not covered by the Act, but that claim-
ants Brown and Harris are covered. He reasons that the test of
coverage is whether an otherwise eligible employee is injured
while engaged in loading or unloading a ship; coverage would not
extend to activities for transshipment of goods removed from a
ship or goods destined for a ship.13M
2
What Judge Winter evidently means by agreement with the "principle"
of the majority panel is that Judge Widener accepts the "point of rest" idea,
but moves it from the side of the ship to the side of the truck (or railway
car). The act of loading goods onto the truck, to Judge Widener, instead
of being the last stage of unloading the ship, is the first stage of loading
the truck for its journey to the consignee. Presumably, when the movement
is reversed, he would view the unloading from the truck into the terminal
as the last stage of the trucking movement; rather than the first stage of
the loading of the ship.
This compromise solution seems to have little merit. It turns too much
on a sort of colloquial concept of what 'loading the ship" means. The
realistic approach, since we are here concerned with a "status" test, is
whether the claimant's work as a whole is identified with the waterfront
or with over-the-road transportation. Obviously if an employee of the
trucking or railway company assisted in the unloading, and then moved
away with the truck or train, his employment would not be covered. But
130.1 542 F.2d 903, 910.
130.2 Id. at 905.
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a terminal employee whose entire function is associated with the movement
of goods within the terminal, in connection with the loading on a ship or
unloading from a ship, should not be segregated from other terminal work-
ers by a semantic distinction between loading a ship and unloading a truck.
Moreover, as Judge Butzner points out, the practical difficulties of applying
Judge Widener's boundary line to the almost unlimited variety of fact
combinations in these cases would be formidable indeed.
By early 1977 four additional circuits had spoken on this issue, -  All
four rejected the "point of rest" theory of the Fourth Circuit. At the same
time, two circuits indicated in dicta that they would not extend coverage as
far as it has been extended by the Benefits Review Board, or would be
extended by Judge Craven in his dissenting opinion in the I.T.O. case-for
example, to clerks.
Pittston involved two workers, Blundo and Caputo. Blundo was a
"checker." Caputo was a loader who was injured while loading cargo into
the consignee's truck. In the First Circuit case, Stockman was a "stripper,"
i.e., he unpacked cargo from containers. Blundo, Caputo, and Stockman
were all held covered under the 1972 amendments.
The Third Circuit case, Sea-Land, involved a tractor rig driver who
was injured while moving a trailer over public streets from one of his
employer's terminals to another, a mile and a half apart. The court held
that his status depended on what he was transporting at the time of injury.
If he was transporting a discharged cargo container to a temporary storage
area, or a cargo container to be loaded aboard a vessel, he was in maritime
employment. If he was delivering a cargo container to a consignee, or if
he was shuttling equipment between the two terminals, he was not.
The Fifth Circuit case, Jacksonville Shipyards, presented an array of
five assorted marginal fact situations, three related to shipbuilding and
repair, and two related to longshoring. Perdue, a shipfitter, who was
injured while alighting from a bus to "punch out" at a point a mile from
the aircraft carrier on which he was worldng, was excluded on both situs
and status grounds. Skipper, a welder engaged in ship repair work, at
the time of injury was dismantling a structure to salvage some steel for use
in building a sandblasting facility; he too was excluded on both situs and
status grounds. Nulty, a carpenter injured at a shipyard while building a
piece of woodwork to be installed on a ship under construction, was held
covered. Ford, who was injured while helping to secure a military vehicle,
which had arrived earlier by sea, to a flat car, was also held covered. Final-
130.3 See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. granted sub nom., Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1977):
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d
629 (3d Cir. 1976); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.
1976), petition for cert. filed sub nom., P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 45 U.S.L.W. 3.364




ly, Bryant, a "cotton header" injured while loading cotton in a pier ware-
house was similarly found covered.
Pittston and Stockman, like I.T.O., presented no situs question at all.
But Sea-Land, since the injury occurred on a public street, necessarily
raised a situs as well as a status question, as did several of the claims in
Jacksonville Shipyards. The main content of the opinions in Pittston, Stock-
man, and the Fourth Circuit case is concerned with legislative history.
Judge Friendly, in Pittston, extracted from this history two relatively
clear items of legislative intent, again seconded by the Stockman opinion:
Two conclusions emerge from this with seeming certainty:
One is that Congress was concerned about "the advent of modem
cargo-handling techniques, such as containerization and the use of
LASH-type vessels," new facts of life of the waterfront which, as
this court noted in Intercontinental Container Transport Corp. v.
New York Shipping Ass'n, (citation omitted), mean that a good
deal more of the longshoreman's traditional jobs are now per-
formed on shore. Stripping a container of goods destined to differ-
ent consignees is the functional equivalent of sorting cargo dis-
charged from a ship; stuffing a container is part of the loading of
the ship even though it is performed on shore and not in the ship's
cargo holds. Congress intended to cover men engaged in these
activities if they met the situs test contained in the Act-irrespec-
tive of the employee's position vis-a-vis a "point of rest .....
The second conclusion is that Congress was concerned with
providing uniformity of coverage for persons engaged in the load-
ing or unloading functions on the piers. It wished to minimize the
occasions when longshoremen and other harbor workers would be
walking from the liberalized benefits of LHWCA to the much
lower ones provided by state compensatidn laws.130-4
Judge Friendly concludes:
We therefore hold that the Amendments at least cover all
persons meeting the situs requirements (1) who are engaged in
stripping or stuffing containers or (2) are engaged in the handling
of cargo up to the point where the consignee has actually begun its
movement from the pier (or in the case of loading, from the time
when the consignee has stopped his vehicle at the pier), provided
in the latter instances that the employee has spent a significant
part of his time in the typical longshoring activity of taking cargo
on or off a vessel. That is as far as we need to go to affirm
Blundo's and Caputo's awards; whether the proviso is essential
can be left for another day. The facts of these cases likewise do not
require us to formulate a rule for the situation wherein the goods
have been deposited in a public warehouse by the stevedore in
unloading or the shipper in loading.13 0 .5
130.4 Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 53-54 (2d Cir.
1976).
130.5 Id. at 56.
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The proviso reflects the point which bothered both courts more than
any other: the statement in the Committee report that "[t]he intent of the
Committee is to permit a uniform compensation to apply to employees who
would otherwise be covered by this Act for part of their activity."* 0
Judge Campbell, writing for the First Circuit in Stockman, does a skill-
ful job of handling this difficulty, so far as the claimants in these cases
are concerned. He draws a distinction between entire categories of workers,
no substantial number of whom would have been covered even in part
before the amendments, and workers who are in a category most of whose
members were previously covered at least in part, but who as individuals
might not meet that test.
Both circuits seem to be quite ready, in dicta, to rule out clerks and
similar employees whose entire category would fall outside the requirement
of having been partly covered before the amendments.
The rationale in Sea-Land is unlike that in either majority or dissenting
opinions in any of the other cases. Confronted with a borderline "situs"
issue, as well as with a borderline "status" issue, the court solved both its
problems by adopting a theory that status is to be determined by function,
and that if the employee is functionally engaged in maritime employment,
maritime situs will, so to speak, follow maritime function. The court said:
The reference in §§ 902(4) and 903(a) to the navigable waters of
the United States shculd be regarded no more than a shorthand
way of relating the function being performed by the injured em-
ployee to waterborne transportation, the jurisdictional nexus ...
The line which Congress intended to draw was between
maritime commerce and land commerce, and the coverage of the
federal law starts at the point where the cargo passes to or from
an employer engaged in the former to an employer engaged in the
latter.1307
It would be inaccurate to say that the operator of a maritime terminal
is engaged in land commerce merely because his employees put sea-borne
cargo onto trucks and railway cars inside the marine terminal.
The Fifth Circuit decision in Jacksonville Shipyards, written by Judge
Tjoflat, takes an expansiv& view of coverage, so far as the concept of loading
and unloading is concerned. One of the longshoremen held covered, Bryant,
was engaged in an intermediate handling function, and so was clearly
covered once the narrow "point of rest" theory was rejected. But Ford was
injured while helping load a vehicle onto a flatcar. Thus he was beyond
the borderline drawn by Judge Widener. The Fifth Circuit expressly found
that loading the goods onto a flatcar was the last stage of the maritime
journey, and that various delays and storages in the interval between the
130.6 H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
130.7 Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams, 540 F.2d 629, 638-39 (3d Cir. 1976).
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ship and the inland transportation were immaterial.
As of January 1977, there bad thus already appeared a spectrum of
views on where the limits of coverage should be placed, with perhaps
seven variants ranging from the narrowest to the broadest: The original
I.T.O. opinion, (Fourth Circuit panel) putting the boundary at the point
of rest beside the ship; Judge Widener's modification (Fourth Circuit en
banc in I.T.O., concurring) moving the point of rest to the side of the truck
or railway car; Judge Friendly's view (Second Circuit, Pittston), rejecting
the point of rest theory, but also by dictum rejecting coverage of clerical
workers; Judge Campbell's opinion (First Circuit, Stockman), also rejecting
the point of rest rule, and also by dictum excluding clerks, but including
any member of any category a substantial part of whose members were
previously covered, regardless of the particular individual's situation; Judge
Gibbon's approach in Sea-Land, making status depend on maritime func-
tion, even on a public street; Judge Craven's dissent in I.T.O., rejecting the
point of rest approach, and indicating approval of the record of decisions
made by the Benefits Review Board, which would include all workers
involved in the processing of maritime cargo, including clerical workers;
finally, Judge Tjoflat's combination in Jacksonville Shipyards, taking the
broadest view of loading and unloading, including loading onto an inland
carrier, but sharply constricting the scope of the amendment by imposing
a pinpoint approach on the status test.
It would be difficult to imagine a situation presenting a more urgent
need for an early Supreme Court resolution,' 30-8 with perhaps tens of thou-
sands of workers inhabiting a shadowland in which the range of the possible
benefits may vary as much as three or four hundred percent.
This review of the point-of-rest versus maritime commerce controversy
may be rounded out with the observation that the Benefits Review Board
in subsequent cases has "stuck to its guns" and refused to accept the Fourth
Circuit's position.'3 ' The Board does not allow itself to be drawn into a
rematch based on the elaborate legal arguments in the Fourth Circuit opin-
ion. It disposes of the matter in each instance with this formula:
The Board is well aware of the restrictive interpretation given
the status requirement by the Fourth Circuit' Court of Appeals in
the recent case of I.T.O. Corporation of Baltimore v. Adkins ....
However, we are of the opinion that our interpretation with regard
to coverage is more in keeping with the amended statute and the
130.8 At this writing, certiorari has been granted in one of the cases, Pittston,
and applied for in several others. Refer to note 130.3 supra.
131. Bradshaw v. J.A. McCarthy, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 195, 198(1976); Santumo v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 262, 264(1976); Cabrera v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 297, 299(1976 ; Norat v. United Terminals, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 337, 338(1976).
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legislative history, and we will continue to follow the line of rea-
soning developed in previous decisions and reiterated in this case.3 2
V. OvERALL DuTrrEs VERsus Im.ImuArE T,4 s% As TEsr
A claimant's status as a covered "employee" is determined by an evalu-
ation of his work activities considered as a whole, not of his activity at the
moment of injury.' 1 In Mildenberger v. Cargill, Inc.,134 claimant was injured
while blending grain in the basement of a grain elevator within a terminal.
After the blending, the grain was weighed, then put in bins for temporary
storage, and ultimately loaded on a vessel. When the grain was being
actually loaded, claimant worked in the galley controlling the flow of
grain onto the conveyor belts carrying the grain to the vessel. The Board
first found that the work of blending the grain was itself an integral part
of the loading process. But, the Board continued, even if it were not, the
claimant would still be an "employee" under the Act because "a large part"
of claimant's duties consisted of controlling the flow of grain onto ships -
undoubtedly a direct part of the loading process. The Board said:
His status as a maritime employee does not change merely because
a segment of his work is not "loading." The purpose of the Act is
to provide compensation for persons engaged in maritime employ-
ment, which includes longshoring operations. Claimant's work
must not be viewed so narrowly as to isolate each segment of his
workday or workweek. Such a narrow view of claimants work
activities would condition coverage upon the fortuitous circum-
stance of a claimant's activity at the moment of injury rather than
upon his status as a maritime employeeyu
The Board then states the rule in these terms: "Thus, a claimant's
status must be determined from an evaluation of his work activities con-
sidered as a whole."5 6 This rather self-evident conclusion could perhaps
be left without additional discussion, if it were not for a directly contrary
dictum in the original I.T.O. majority opinion and a contra holding in
Jacksonville Shipyards. Early in the I.T.O. opinion, the court presents the
following statement without discussion or elaboration:
Ordinarily the question of whether a person was engaged in
"maritime employment" is to be determined as of "the time of the
accident." Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244, 247, 62 S.Ct.
132. Bradshaw v. J.A. McCarthy, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 195, 198
(1976).
133. Mildenberger v. Cargill, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 51, 55 (1975);
Bradshaw v. J.A. McCarthy, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 177 (1975);
De Liso v. Transocean Gateway Terminal, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad.
L.J.) 254 (1975); Halbrook v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv.
(Ad. L.J.) 8 (1975); Alvarez v. Atlantic Container Lines, Ltd., 2 Benefits Review
Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 137 (1975).
134. 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 51 (1975).




221, 86 L.Ed. 184 (1941). See Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344
U.S. 334, 340, 73 S.Ct. 302, 97 L.Ed. 367 (1953). 137
This statement may appropriately be characterized as a dictum since it
did not influence the actual decision one way or another. Virtually all of
the activities of the three plaintiffs-not merely those at the time of the
accident-fell beyond the point of rest which the court found to be the
outer limit of maritime employment. Later, in a footnote," 8 the court men-
tions that one of the plaintiffs had sometimes in the past and on weekends
worked on ships or on actual loading and unloading, but the court merely
reiterated its time of accident rule. It characterized the work on ships as
sporadic overtime assignments. If this characterization were accurate, the
court could have reached the identical result by applying the Benefits
Review Board rule that his duties must be considered as a whole.
The Fifth Circuit, in Jacksonville Shipyards, also commits a serious
blunder in applying the "pin-point" rule to the status test. What was a
harmless dictum in I.T.O.-that claimant's status is determined by what he
was doing at the instant of injury-becomes a controlling rationale here
which helped to defeat two of the claims. The court's handling of this point
is superficial at best, and downright inaccurate at worst. The court relies
on only one authority-Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore.138 .1 But this point
was not in issue in Gilmore. The claimant there was at all times a pondman.
There is nothing to indicate that he was ever covered as to any of his
duties. Any use of the words "time of injury," then, would be purely
obiter dictum. The court carelessly scrambles the pin-point issue as to
status and as to situs in the only other sentence supporting its conclusion:
"The legislative history tells us that an injured employee will be covered
if he was 'engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel'
but will not be covered merely because he was injured in the area defined
by new Section 903(a) ."13 8-2 If Congress had meant what Judge Tjoflat
suggests, it would have inserted the words "at the time of injury" after
the word "vessel" in this passage. The total excerpt from the Report em-
phatically gives the opposite impression, by stressing that the purpose of
the amendment is precisely to avoid the in-or-out coverage that had grown
up under earlier tests.
The court's citation of O'Rourke for the proposition that "maritime
employment" is to be determined as of time of accident is a plain blunder.
To the contrary, the Court specifically held that coverage of the Longshore-
men's Act did not require maritime employment. It was on this precise
point that four justices dissented. The holding of O'Rourke is merely that
the time of accident governs the situs test, and that the occurrence of the
137. 529 F.2d at 1084.
138. Refer to note 108 supra for full text of the footnote.
138.1 528 F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 179 (1976).
138.2 Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 539 (5th Cir. 1970).
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injury upon navigable waters was controlling. Therefore, the Longshore-
men's Act applied, and a railroad brakeman injured on a freight car situ-
ated on a car float could not maintain a suit under the FELA.
As to the continuing situs test, now expanded to adjoining areas, it is
undoubtedly still true that the time of accident governs. This must be so,
because the test is addressed to the injury, not to the person. An injury has
a time, and it has a place. Either that place is within the statutorily desig-
nated area at that time, or it is not. But the "maritime employment" test
is addressed to the status of a person. That status is not necessarily con-
trolled by what he was doing at any particular moment.
The other case cited, Parker, is equally out of place. Parker, although
using the language of maritime employment, was not dealing with a status
test of maritime employment in the Act, but with the moribund test of
"absence of state power." The real effect of Parker was to set the stage for
a "twilight zone" period, which culminated in the judicial demolition of the
absence of state power test altogether.13 9
The modem status test of "maritime employment," which had no coun-
terpart in the Longshoremen's Act at the time O'Rourke and Parker were
decided, assimilates the Longshoremen's test to the Jones Act concept,
except as the former is spatially limited by the situs test. And under the
Jones Act, as the Supreme Court said in launching the new era of landward
extension of that act in O'Donnell: "The right of recovery in the Jones Act
is given to the seaman as such .... I'll
It cannot be too strongly stressed that, under the status test here in-
volved, -we are dealing with the definition and identification of a pcrson,
not of an event. To take the simplest case: Suppose a man loads cargo onto
ships nine-tenths of the time, and one-tenth of the time he blends grain.
The Act says that "employee" includes a "longshoreman." Is this man a long-
shoreman? Look at him. If he is not a longshoreman, what is he?
A good way to highlight the fact that status cannot be pinpointed by
a particular moment in time is to try to apply the Fourth Circuit's time of
accident test to the Act's definition of employer: "an employer, any of
whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in
part... *" Now we have no time of accident to use as a point of reference.
The status of those employees as in "maritime employment" must be deter-
mined independently of any particular moment in time.
The practical reason for this conclusion, as emphasized by the Benefits
Review Board in Mildenberger,141 is that the time of accident approach
would fragment a single individual's status into covered and noncovered
segments as he went from one task to another. Here again, this is precisely
what Congress had set out to avoid through the 1972 amendments.
139. Refer to text accompanying note 8 supra.
140. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36,42 (1943).
141. Mildenberger v. Cargill Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 51 (1975).
1977]
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
The trouble here stems largely from a failure to distinguish between
three independent tests of coverage. As has been noted, one is the test that
acts upon the injury itself, and asks where it occurred. The next acts upon
the person, and asks who he was. The third, not to be confused with the
qecond, asks whether he was in the course of employment when injured.
Let us suppose that we have concluded that Joe Hill is a "longshore-
man" within the definition of "employee." There may still remain a ques-
tion, as to a particular activity, whether it was in the course of employment
- not in the course of maritime employment, mind you - just in the course
of employment. This kind of question could come up as to any of the
familiar borderline course of employment areas: personal comfort, recrea-
tional and social activities, going and coming, horseplay, preparatory acts,
collecting pay, acts helping customers or strangers, acts benefitting the
claimant, union and patriotic activities, rescue or emergency acts, and so
on. Suppose, then, as Joe is working in a terminal, a child runs in off the
street chased by a mad dog. Joe sets off in pursuit, to save the child, and
eventually is himself injured. Now, what is the correct question to ask? Do
you ask: Was Joe in maritime employment while chasing the dog and
therefore in such employment at the time of accident? Or do you ask: Was
Joe simply in the course of employment? The correct question is the latter.
The question about maritime employment was relevant only to establishing
Joe's status as a longshoreman, and that was already settled. From then on,
one asks of Joe, as of any other worker under a compensation act, whether
he was in the course of employment, by standards that apply equally to
nonmaritime and maritime incidents. And, under federal law, he would
probably recover under the rescue doctrine.14 A fortiori then, if Joe at the
time of accident is not engaged in a marginal activity such as chasing a
mad dog, but is working at a task assigned by his employer, he remains
"in the course of employment" even if the particular task would not of
itself qualify as maritime, and he certainly does not forfeit his longshoreman
status and protection for the duration of the nonmaritime task.
Lest it be thought that the rule here favored is a one-way street
toward enlarging the coverage of the act, one must stress that the rule cuts
both ways and also bars coverage to persons who were not "employees"
on the strength of their work activities considered as a whole.1 43 Thus,
several plaintiffs were held not covered when burned by an explosion on
an offshore petroleum production platform, although they sometimes
assisted in loading and unloading wireline equipment. Their primary duties,
however, were operation of specialized tools and equipment to drop wvireline
into oil wells to remove sediment. At the time of the explosion, the plain-
142. See O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 507 (1951).
143. See, e.g., Wiley v. Wilson Wireline Servs., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv.(Ad. L.J.) 86 (1975); Henning v. Vacco Wireline Serv., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 87 (1975); Neal v. Wilson Wireline Servs., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 88 (1975).
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tiffs were changing clothes preparatory to performing these primary duties.
VI. TmF A'uD SpACE INTERVAL BmwEN OFFLOADiN
FROM SHIPS AID INJURY
So long as cargo remains in maritime commerce, in that it has not been
delivered to a trucker or other carrier for transshipment to its destination,'"
the distance in space or time between the offloading from the ship and the
place and time of injury are not determinative of the continuation of mari-
time employment.
As to spatial distance, a number of cases were cited earlier in the
discussion of the situs test involving distances from 75 to 2000 feet from
the water's edge, all of which were held immaterial so long as the situs
was within a terminal adjoining navigable waters.14 But, for present pur-
poses, the distances can sometimes be much greater, since they refer, not
to the distance between the situs of injury and water, but to the distance
the goods have traveled from the ship before being handled by this claim-
ant, and the legal issue is not whether the situs of injury is an area "adjoin-
ing" navigable waters but whether the maritime-commerce character of the
cargo's movement has been interrupted or destroyed by the sheer size of
its journey. In Dillon v. United Terminals, Inc., 146 for example, the container
in question had been offloaded from a vessel at Weehawken, New Jersey,
and had been transported overland by teamsters approximately twelve
miles to Port Newark, New York. The injury occurred as the container was
being stripped at the employer's Port Newark terminal facility. Note that
there was no situs problem, since, after the overland journey, the cargo was
once more inside a terminal. The law judge ruled that variations in locale
and continuity did not change the maritime character of the shipment, and
that the maritime employment status of the claimant was not affected by
the overland interlude.
This principle was carried to its logical conclusion in Santumo V. Sea-
Land Service, Inc.,147 in which it was held that cargo in containers trans-
ported across the United States to a warehouse where it was unpacked
remained in maritime commerce, if the transporter-by-land was the ocean
carrier itself. Under Dillon, however, it apparently did not matter that the
overland transportation was by teamsters. Accordingly, a coast-to-coast land
journey of unopened cargo containers would seem to be once more in mari-
time commerce when they arrive in a terminal, no matter who provided the
overland transportation. The injury in Santumo, as in Dillon, occurred in
the course of handling the cargo within a terminal, and there seems to be
144. See Blundo v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 Benefits Review
Board Serv. 376 (1975); Cabrera v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 99 (1975).
145. Refer to cases cited at notes 39-45 supra.
146. 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 1 (1975).
147. 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 209 (1975).
1977]
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
no reason why the identity of the overland carrier should make any dif-
ference.
As to lapse of time between offloading and injury, awards have been
made when the interval was a day,148 2 days,1 49 5 days, ' 7 days,51 8
days, 152 a week or two,' 53 15 days,'- 5 weeks,' 55 and 133 days." 0
In the 133-day case, the employer had specifically argued that the
passage of time between removing the cargo from the ship and placing it
on the truck, during which time it rested on the pier, was so lengthy that
the unloading process had long since ceased and been replaced by a process
of storage. The Board disagreed:
There is no question that this cargo was held on the pier
pending completion of arrangements for its delivery to a consignee.
Removal of a cargo from a vessel and placing it temporarily at
rest on a pier does not terminate the maritime nature of the cargo.
See Richardson v. Great Lakes Storage and Contracting Co., 2
BRBS 31, BRB Nos. 74-212, 212A (June 26, 1975). That circum-
stances necessitated retention of this cargo on a pier for an unusu-
ally long period is irrelevant. 5 7
VII. MAmirrumzi STATus OF PARncuLu Ac'rvrrxEs
It was noted earlier, in the discussion of the I.T.O. case, 58 that the
total process of movement of cargo from the outside world to the ship (and
the reverse process) may often display as many as four identifiable stages:
from truck or railway car to warehouse; from warehouse to "stuffing" point
by forklift; from "stuffing" point to dockside by "hustler"; and finally from
dockside onto the ship itself.
The Benefits Review Board has held repeatedly and consistently that
148. Allen v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.)
96 (1975); Sorrentino v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review
Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 127 (1975); Green v. Atlantic Container Lines Ltd. 2 Benefits
Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 62, af f'd, 2 Benefits Review Board Ser'. 385 (1975).
149. Petti v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 20 (1975).
150. Caputo v. Northeast Marine Terminal Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv.
(Ad. L.J.) 4, aff'd, 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 13 (1975); Ascione v. Universal
Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 230 (1975).
151. Logan v. Universal Terminal Stevedoring Corp., 3 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 55 (1975).
152. Parks v. Lavino Shipping Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.)
108 (1975), aff'd, 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 236 (1976); Cabrera v. Maher
Terminals, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 99 (1975), affd, 3 Benefits
Review Board Serv. 297 (1976).
153. Chirco v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. LJ.) 130 (1975).
154. De Santis v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review
Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 135 (1975).
155. Robinson v. Northern Metal Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.)
240 (1975).
156. Dellaventura v. Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv.
340 (1975).
157. Id. at 342.
158. Refer to text accompanying note 107 supra.
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all such cargo movements, and all incidental operations along the way,
such as "stuffing," "stripping," and checking, constitute maritime employ-
ment. Subject always to the caveat that the contest between the point-of-
rest theory and the maritime commerce theory, on which theory all these
BRB decisions are based, was unresolved at the time these Board decisions
were made, one may now review the particular kinds of loading, unloading,
and related activity that have been found by the Board to fall within the
term "maritime employment."
A. Loading and Unloading Trucks and Railway Cars
Unloading cargo from a truck inside a pierside warehouse, prior to
placement of the cargo by others aboard vessels, is maritime employmentYz
Thus, a "cotton header" injured while unloading cotton bales from a truck
was found to be an "employee" under the act.I ° Such cargo handling opera-
tions, said the Board, constitute the first step in a series of longshoring
operations, although the bales were not moving to the ship itself at the
time of injury. Similarly, the moving of cargo from a railroad car to a shed
on a wharf is an activity within maritime employment.' 6'
The corresponding segment of the reverse process, that of final loading
of cargo onto trucks'G or rail cars' 63 for shipment to destination is also
within maritime employment. This is considered the final step of unloading
a ship,'6 since the cargo is deemed to remain in maritime commerce until
it has been delivered to a trucker for transshipment to destination.'1 The
claimant is covered even if he was inside the consignee's truck at the time
of injury.166 And, as noted in the preceding subsection, the mere passage
159. Bryant v. Ayers S.S. Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 408 (1975).
160. Id.
161. Romero v. United Terminals, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. LJ.)
224 (1975); James v. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad.
L.J.) 222 (1975); Diglovanni v. Universal Terminal and Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits
Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 149 (1975).
162. Reyes v. United Terminals, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 358, 359-60
(1976); Cabrera v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Sem. 297, 299
(1976); Caputo v. Northeast Marine Terminal Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv.
13, 14-16 (1975); Dellaventura v. Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. 340, 343 (1975); Avvento v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 1 Benefits Review Board Serv.
174, 175, 179 (1974); Billitteri v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits
Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 223 (1975); Cannata v. Universal Terminal & Steve-
doing Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 219 (1975); Do Santis v.
Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 135(1975); Chirco v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 130 (1975); Blanco v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2
Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 7 (1975).
163. Ascione v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review
Board Serv. (Ad. LJ.) 230 (1975).
164. Avvento v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 1 Benefits Review Board Serv. 174, 177
(1974).
165. Cabrera v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 297, 299
(1976).




of time does not in itself separate the truck-loading operation from maritime
commerce. Many of the cases on this timelapse question were truck-loading
cases, including the case in which trucks were being loaded after a 133-day
delay. 167
B. Movement of Cargo Within Terminal and Dockside Area
Movement of cargo from one point to another in a terminal,168 or be-
tween the terminal and dockside,169 is also within maritime employment.
Moreover, employment as operator of a "hustler," used to transport con-
tainers within a terminal, qualifies the claimant as a covered "employee,"
since he is engaged in an essential step in the overall process of loading
cargo.170
C. "Stuffing" and Palletizing
"Stuffing," i.e., packing cargo into containers, is an integral and essen-
tial part of the total process of loading cargo aboard a vessel, 7' and workers
engaged in such activity, including forklift operators172 and checkers,7
are "employees" within the act.174 By the same token, a worker who pal-
letized cargo in a warehouse as a warehouseman before it was loaded
onto vessels was held to be engaged in maritime employment.17 5
D. "Stripping" Containers
"Stripping" is, so to speak, the reverse of "stuffing" - i.e., it is the
unpacking of cargo from cargo containers. Any activity connected with
stripping, including attempting to open the doors from the container, 7 '
167. Refer to notes 156-57 supra.
168. Smith v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 112 (1975).
169. Arena v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 253 (1975); Sorrentino v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp.,
2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 127 (1975); Ridgely v. Great Lakes Storage
& Contracting Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 63 (1975).
170. Scafiddi v. Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 47,
49 (1975); Harris v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 Benefits Review Board Serv. 301, 302,
304 (1975).
171. Brown v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 Benefits Review Board Serv. 212,
213-14 (1974).
172. Mezzina v. Marine Terminals Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 401,
402 (1975).
173. Jones v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 101 (1975).
174. See Batista v. Atlantic Container Lines, Ltd., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv.
193 (1975) (involving loading drums into a container).
175. McCown v. Strachan Shipping Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad.
L.J.) 112 (1976). The court rejected an argument based on the fact that the claimant
did not belong to the local union whose members loaded cargo directly onto vessels. Id.
176. Spataro v. Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 122,
123 (1975).
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actually removing the contents, 77 checking the cargo stripped,rs and re-
turning a hand truck used in the process to a locker,"D is maritime employ-
ment
E. Incidental Acts Facilitating Maritine Commerce
Ancillary and incidental activities that facilitate maritime commerce
are maritime employment. 80 Thus, claimant's movement from a dock to a
terminal of an empty chassis used to transport cargo to and from a'vessel
has been held covered; moving the chassis was necessary to make room
for loading and unloading of the next arriving vessel."8 The duties of a
"pipe man" - unhooking and hooking container lock mechanisms connect-
ing cargo containers with the chassis, preparatory to container stuffing or
stripping by others - are an integral part of a continuous longshoring oper-
ation.12 An elevator leadman has been held to play an integral part in
assuring the smooth operation of the process of unloading soybeans from
barges at a grain storage facility, 8 3 as have workers whose activity involved
weighing grain either for temporary storage or immediate loading on a
vessel,'8 and blending grain, most of which would be loaded aboard a
vessel after resting briefly in a storage bin.185 A cooper was held to be in
maritime employment when repairing damaged cocoa bean bags after
their removal from a vessel to a pier, the Board pointing out that the
cargo's movement was necessarily delayed until he had finished his work.- '
Banding cotton bales together and piling them for future loading aboard
177. Perez v. United Terminals, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 368, 369
(1976); Norat v. United Terminals, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 337 (1976);
Suarez v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 17, 18-19 (1975);
Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 99 (1975);
Logan v. Universal Terminal Stevedoring Corp., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad.
L.J.) 55 (1975); Robinson v. Northern Metal Co., 2 Benefits Reviev Board Serv.(Ad. L.J.) 240 (1975); Alvarez v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 Benefits
Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 16 (1975) (claimant was also loading cargo from
containers onto pallets).
178. Blundo v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. 376 (1975); Dillon v. United Terminals, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv.
(Ad. L.J.) 1 (1975).
179. Lopez v. Atlantic Container Lines, Ltd., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv.
265, 266-68 (1975).
180. Franklin v. Atlantic Container Lines, Ltd., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv.
(Ad. L.J.) 213 (1975).
181. Watson v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 47,
48-49 (1975).
182. Franklin v. Atlantic Container Lines, Ltd., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv.
(Ad. L.J.) 213 (1975).
183. Brocks v. Cargill, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 14 (1975).
184. Halbrook v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Sev. (Ad. L.J.)
8 (1975).
185. Mildenberger v. Cargill, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 51, 52, 54
(1975).




a vessel is covered, the banding being the initial step in the vessel-loading
process.1 s7
Maintenance and repair of longshoring equipment, whether on ship or
on shore, has been held by the Board to be essential to the movement of
maritime cargo and accordingly covered.18 8 Again, when a number of bot-
tles of liqueur had been broken in transit, the task of separating out the
broken bottles was held to be part of maritime commerce.189 Similarly, a
worke, whose regular duties concerned the maintenance, inspection and
repair of a pier was found to have been injured in maritime employment,
even though at the time he was merely moving a can of paint which was
not part of the ship's cargo.190
F. Checking and Spotting
Checkers have been consistently held to be in maritime employment. 101
In this instance, there happens to be a fragment of legislative history to
bolster the result. In the Senate Report dealing with the extent of the
expansion of coverage intended by the amendments, it is stated: "[C]heck-
ers... who are directly involved in the loading or unloading functions are
covered by the new amendment."192 Of course, this still leaves the question
of what is meant by "directly involved in the loading and unloading func-
tions." Indeed, the majority in the original I.T.O. opinion relied on this
passage to support their view that maritime employment extended only to
the first point of rest after the cargo left the ship. 193
The Board, since it has treated all activities up to receipt of the cargo
by the consignee's truck as being directly involved in loading or unloading,
has of course included checking activities at every point, including stuff-
187. Santos v. Richard Bugg & Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.)
3 (1975).
188. Bradshaw v. J.A. McCarthy, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 195, 198
(1976).
189. Martinez v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review
Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 212 (1975).
190. DeLiso v. Transocean Gateway Terminal, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 254 (1975).
191. Parks v. Lavino Shipping Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 236, 238
(1976); Lind v. Independent Pier Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 232, 234 (1976);
Green v. Atlantic Container Lines, Ltd., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 385 (1975);
Blundo v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 376
(1975); Allen v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 96
1975); McCue v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 Benefits Review Board
Serv. (Ad. LJ.) 248 (1975); Jones v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 Benefits
Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 101 (1975); McMenomon v. Northeast Marine Terminal
Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 51 (1975); Pettl v. Universal Terminal
& Stevedoring Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 20 (1975); Dillon v.
United Terminals, Inc., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 1 (1975).
192. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972).
193. See generally I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir.
1975), modified on rehearing, 542 F.2d 903 (1976) (en bane).
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ing,'9 stripping,les and temporary storage. 106 Coverage has even been held
to extend to a checker who checked bags on a railway car, which were
being loaded in a container, which then would be placed on a vessel.'1a
The coverage of the act also extends to spotting of cargo for loading
on a ship.19 A claimant, employed as a checker, was held to have been
engaged in maritime employment when he drove the employer's automo-
bile around a terminal area to determine the final location of cargo that
was ready to be loaded aboard a vessel.ro
G. Clerical Work
The Board has taken the position that clerical work is maritime employ-
ment if it is directly related to loading and unloading functios.-3 In this
instance we again find some legislative history, at the same point in the
Senate Report just quoted in connection 'with checkers. This time, however,
the language of the report, being exclusive in effect rather than inclusive,
is something to be explained away rather than to be affirmatively relied
on by the Board. The Report states:
The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not
engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel,
just because they are injured in an area adjoinng navigable waters
used for such activity. Thus, employees whose responsibility is
only to pick up stored cargo for further transshipment would not
be covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose jobs do not
require them to participate in the loading or unloading of cargo.
However, checkers, for example, who are directly involved in the
loading and unloading functions are covered by the new amend-
ment.201
In Coppolino v. International Terminal Operating Co. -,2 - the first case
to present this issue, the claimant served as a hiring agent and as head
foreman supervising loading and unloading operations. A part of his job
involved feeding the names of the hired employees into an IBM machine
194. Refer to note 173 supra.
195. Refer to note 178 supra.
196. See Parks v. Lavino Shipping Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 236, 237(1976).
197. McMenomon v. Northeast Terminal Co., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 232
(1976).
198. Lind v. Independent Pier Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 232, 234
(1976).
199. Muldowney v. Lavino Shipping Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 229, 230(1976).
200. Farrell v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 42, 45-46
(1975); Coppolino v. International Terminal Operating Co., 1 Benefits Review Board
Serv. 205,207 (1974).
For a similar holding as to shipbuilding, see Luker v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 3 Bene-
fits Review Board Serv. 321 (1976), in which a clerical function necessary to the
overseeing of pipefitting in an assembly shipbuilding process on dry land was held to
be maritime employment.
201. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972) (emphasis added).
202. 1 Benefits Review Board Serv. 205 (1974).
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located in a building on the pier 150 feet from the water. He injured his
back while replacing special paper in the IBM machine. Note that this
claimant was directly involved in pure longshoring activities in that he
actually supervised loading and unloading functions. The case, then, could
have been treated as one in which the character of the activity at the
moment of injury was not decisive,203 and in the first part of its opinion
the Board did seem to be taking that line:
The functions of the claimant herein, as a hiring agent and
as a head foreman supervising loading and unloading operations,
constitute longshoring operations. The fact that at the time of
injury he was engaged in a clerical function necessary to the per-
formance of his job does not remove him from the sphere of long-
shoring operations, nor from coverage under the Act.
2°4
But the Board goes on to meet head-on the argument that clerical
work itself is not covered. It quotes the excerpt from the Senate Report
set out above,20 5 and concludes that Congress did not mean to limit coverage
to workers engaged in physical loading and unloading. If that had been
the intention, it could have been so expressed in the act or in the Report.
Inevitably a case arose in which the employee's only duties were
clerical, and in which the claimant's status had to stand or fall entirely on
his clerical work, unassisted by a background of other clearly covered
duties. In Farrell v. Maher Terminals, Inc.200 the claimant was a tempo-
rary delivery clerk. His job was to process paperwork necessary to the
delivery of cargo to truckers. He worked in an office in a building adjoin-
ing a container shed, 2500 feet from the water line. (To add to the non-
maritime flavor of the case, the injury was the result of slipping on a patch
of ice between a parking lot and the time clock, and the employer had paid
compensation voluntarily under the New Jersey Act.) It was true that the
claimant occasionally went to a shed or loading platform to examine mark-
ings on cargo, and more rarely might even go aboard a ship to deliver a
package.
The Board's disposition of the issue, including the language in the
Senate Report, can be summed up as follows. The clerical workers excluded
by the Committee language are only those whose work is not related to
loading and unloading.
The heart of the present controversy is whether or not the
claimant is an "employee" as defined in Section 2(3). The claimant
was found to be "primarily (if not 'purely') a clerical employee."
However, Congress did not intend to exclude all clerical em-
ployees from the Act's coverage; only those purely clerical em-
203. Refer to text following note 133 supra.
204. 1 Benefits Review Board Serv. at 207-08.
205. Refer to text accompanying note 201.
206. 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 42 (1975).
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ployees whose jobs do not require them to participate in the
loading or unloading of cargo are excluded.207
The Board then makes a rather persuasive point by stressing that
checkers are expressly mentioned in the Report as covered employees,
although their work is clerical in nature - that is, they work with paper
and pencil, not with a forklift and crane. This being so, it must not be
the overt physical nature of the work that controls, but the functional
relation of the work to the movement of cargo. Thus, it can be argued
that the cargo could no more be moved without Farrell's paperwork than
it could without a checker's clearance. The Board said:
These cited passages [in the Senate Report] use checkers as an
example of clerical employees who are covered by the Act; there
is certainly no indication in the legislative history that other clerical
employees who are also directly involved in the loading or unload-
ing functions, are excluded from coverage under the Act.-
It is amusing to observe that the Board in this case has achieved almost
overnight a construction which, in a somewhat comparable situation involv-
ing the FELA, took the Supreme Court forty years. In 1956, after decades
of uncertainty and litigation about the boundaries of the FELA,-02 ' which
turned on the test of affecting interstate commerce, the Supreme Court
finally decided that clerical work by a railway employee satisfied this test.
In Reed v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.Y1 plaintiff was an office clerk whose
duties included filing the master tracings from which blueprints of designs
of the railroad's engines, cars, parts, and bridges were made. The Supreme
Court ruled that her activities affected interstate commerce, because they
were indispensable to the conduct of the railroad's business.
Thus, the Board's test is essentially a test already endorsed by the
Supreme Court, the only difference being the substitution of "maritime
commerce" for "interstate commerce." Of course, the background and legis-
lative history in the two situations are by no means the same; but on the
central issue whether clerical work is somehow in an excluded class by
itself because of its nonphysical quality, Reed could supply an important
buttress for the Board position After all, in Reed, the defendants had
argued along lines quite similar to those heard in the present controversy.
They had urged that the FELA, after all, was supposed to apply to trans-
portation employees, who were subject to the well-known hazards of rail-
roading, and not to office workers injured by glass from a broken office
wndow. So here: It is argued that the Longshoremen's Act is for people
who really lift and move cargo, and are exposed to the kind of hazards
inherent in such work-not for people who hurt their backs lifting IBM
207. !1& at 44-45 (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 45.
209. See 3 A. LARsoN, supra note 2, §§ 91.40.53.
210. 351 U.S. 502 (1956).
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paper or who slip on ice on their way to an office desk covered with bills
of lading and such. Yet, once the door has been opened to admit checkers
and spotters, it begins to appear that the distinction cannot be merely
muscular work versus intellectual work. And if that is not the distinction,
it is difficult to see where the stopping-point will be, short of coverage of
all clerical work essential to the movement and handling of cargo in mari-
time commerce.
H. Ship Repairmen
The definition of "employee" expressly includes any "ship repair-
man. 2 1' Questions occasionally arise as to the breadth of reach of this
term, particularly as to various peripheral and ancillary activities.
A relatively clear case was that of Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp.212
The definition of "employee" under the 1972 amendments was held by a
district court to include a shore-based employee engaged in cleaning rust
from the walls of a vessel's cargo tank, for purposes of converting it from
the hauling of petroleum to the hauling of wheat. It is interesting to note
that this was an "upside-down" case, in which the plaintiff was trying to
take himself out of the Act in order to escape the bar of the 1972 amend-
ments against the bringing of unseaworthiness actions.
The work of a ship repairman does not necessarily have to be work
on a ship. It can also be work on other items that in turn are associated
with ships or ship repair. Thus, in Cooper v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons213 the
claimant was injured while repairing a tank, bordered on two sides by
water, from which oil was pumped aboard vessels. The claimant was held
covered both because the work itself was maritime employment, and be-
cause almost all of his work generally was that of installing and repairing
pipes aboard vessels.
Repair of machinery which in turn is used to repair or build ships has
been held covered. In Kininess v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co "14
the claimant was injured while sandblasting a crane, in preparation for its
use in connection with his employer's ship repair and shipbuilding activi-
ties. His usual duty was that of "inside painting" in the construction and
repair of ships. Here again, the claimant was held covered both because
his immediate task was in maritime employment and because his overall
duties were those of a ship repairman.
For an example of* a marginal activity held to fall short of maritime
0
211. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 2(3), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 902(3) (Supp. 1976).
212. 375 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
213. 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 56 (1975).
214. 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 24" (1975), aff'd, 4 Benefits Re-
view Board Serv. 13 (1976). See also Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d
533 (5th Cir. 1976).
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employment, one may adduce D'Amato v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons. 'i Claimant
worked as a chauffeur for the employer. His principal place of employ-
ment was Bushey's garage, which was separated by a public street from
the employer's shipyard, and was not within the fenced-in area of the
shipyard. His duties consisted of driving ship parts between the shipyard
and repair shops in New York City, and of carrying passengers within and
without the shipyard. He injured himself while lifting a heavy ship's starter
to transfer it between a station wagon and a van in the garage. There was
some conflict in the evidence on whether claimant sometimes would go
aboard a ship to pick up or deliver parts. In any event, the bulk of his
duties appeared to be located in the garage or between the shipyard and
various repair shops. The law judge ruled out coverage on the ground that
claimant was not a covered employee, although he went on and, for good
measure, concluded that the situs of the injury was not an "adjoining"
area.2 16 The two questions were somewhat related, since the judge won-
dered, if claimant were covered, where in the course of his duties his situs
coverage would begin and end as he came and went in the streets of New
York. The effect would certainly be to produce a ease of partial coverage,
which was looked upon with disfavor by the Benefits Review Board..217
The judge first ruled that "none of Claimant's duties bore upon either long-
shoring or harbor working." But he went on:
Even if Claimant's function is considered to be related to ship
repairing, it is dearly not such an integral part thereof that status
coverage should be found. The function of parts delivery is a
generic one, not related exclusively to ship repairing. It could just
as well have been performed in this case either by the parts repair
shop, or an independent delivery service, as by Claimant .... .,8
L Shipbuilders
The term "employee" is defined to include specifically a "shipbuild-
er."219 In view of this express language, the Benefits Review Board has stated
215. 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 179 (1975).
216. Refer to text following note 38 supra.
217. See Perdue v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1 Benefits Review Board Serv. 297(1975). In this case the claimant was a shipfitter. He was injured while alighting from
a bus to "punch out" at his employer's office within the naval station. The office where
he was to "punch out" was over a mile away from the ship where he worked, but wavs
still with the naval station and was itself within 50 feet of the water. Moreover, the
office was an integral part of the ship repair facility. Claimant was held covered by
the Act. Id. at 300. On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed stating that under no reasonable
construction of the Act did the area in question either "adjoin" the vaters or carry out
any of the functions specified in § 903(a). The court also rejected the argument that
the Act covers every point in a large marine facili where a ship repairman might go
at his employer's direction. 539 F.2d 533, 542 (5% Cir. 1976). But note that in the
same case, Nulty, a carpenter injured while building a piece of woodwork to be
installed on a ship under construction, was found to be covered. Id. at 543-44.
218. 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) at 185.
219. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 2(3), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 902(3) (Supp. 1976).
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that pre-amendment cases holding that new ship construction on dry land
was not maritime activity must be rejected. 22 The Senate Report states:
Accordingly, the Bill would amend the Act to provide coverage
of longshoremen, harbor workers, ship repairmen, shipbuilders,
shipbreakers, and other employees engaged in maritime employ-
ment .... 221
The cases that have appeared in the reports have mostly involved
work on components or parts that are later installed in ships, and such work,
done in a shipyard, has invariably been considered shipbuilding. Thus, in
Morgan v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp.22 2 the worker was a shipfitter helper
apprentice in the fabrication shop, a place for cutting, shaping, tacking, and
welding steel parts that were later used in the construction and repair of
ships. He was actually engaged in this kind of work when killed by the
fall of a steel plate. The Board said: "The Board finds this to be an essen-
tial aspect of the employer's shipbuilding enterprise and thus maritime
employment within the meaning of the Act."223
In Mohamed v. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp.224 claimant was a member
of a unit which completed the processing of components prior to their
installation on vessels, but which did not install them or transport them to
vessels. He was held covered. And in Dubay v. FMC Marine & Rail Equip-
ment Corp.,225 claimant worked as a rigger for one of two overhead bridge
cranes, which were used in the fabrication of sections of a vessel under
construction. He was found to be a qualified employee.
It has already been noted in connection with the problem of clerical
workers2 26 that one of the authorities for inclusion of clerical work was a
shipbuilding case, Luker v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Co. 227 In Luker, claimant
was a pipe-fitter supervisor, who was returning to his work shack on the
shipyard premises with his men's signed time cards when he tripped over
a T-beam, injuring his back. With no discussion, the Board concluded that
claimant's duties as supervisor were an essential part of ship construction,
that he was therefore a "shipbuilder," and that "the fact that, at the time
of injury, claimant was performing a clerical function necessary to the
performance of his supervisory duties does not exclude him from the Act's
coverage."228
220. Luker v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 321, 324
(1976).
221. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972) (emphasis added).
222. 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 310 (1976).
223. Id. at 312, citing Maxin v. Dravo Corp., 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 372
1975); Skipper v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 1 Benefits Review Board Serv. 533
(1975); Nulty v. Halter Marine Fabricators, 1 Benefits Review Board Serv. 437 (1975).
224. 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 85 (1975).
225. 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 43 (1975). See also Kininess v.
Alabama Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. (Ad. L.J.) 24 (1975)
(sandblasting a crane).
226. Refer to text following note 200 supra.
227. 3 Benefits Review Board Serv. 321 (1976).
228. Id. at 325.
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I. Shipbreakers
The definition of employee in the Longshoremen's Act specifically
includes "any ... shipbreaker.2"9 This might seem to make the coverage
of shipbreakers as clear as that of shipbuilder and ship repairmen-which
it would be but for a curious inconsistency in the new material added by
the 1972 amendments. The parallel situs test reads as follows:
Compensation shall be payable . . . only if the disability or
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock,
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
or building a vessel).?
0
"Repairing" and "building"-but nothing about breaking or scrapping.
Read in the strictest literal sense, then, since both these tests must be in-
dependently satisfied, this combination means that a shipbreaker might
have a covered status but not have a covered place for his injury to hap-
pen in.
No cases on this dilemma appeared in the first three years of the
amendment's life, but the Labor Department at one time started to deal
with the question through guidelines. On May 17, 1974, the Department
of Labor issued "Proposed Guidelines" on "Coverage under the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act." These Guidelines were
never promulgated, ' but they do supply a strong indication of the Depart-
ment's view on coverage of shipbreaking:
Shoreside coverage; shipbuilding, ship repairing, and ship-
breaking.
(a) . . . . The provisions of the Longshoremen's Act now
extend to all shipyard work performed in adjoining areas customar-
ily used by an employee in the physical construction, repair, or
breaking (i.e., scrapping) of a vessel 2 -
It must be said that the Department was taking some liberties with
the statute when, gratuitously and without explanation, it added "breaking"
(i.e., scrapping) to the literal text of the coverage section at precisely the
point where those words are omitted in the statute itself. It is quite likely
that this will indeed be the final outcome in the courts, but this result
should not be too easily taken for granted. In its favor is the highly persua-
sive argument that Congress could hardly have intended to create the
paradox of a specifically covered employee with no place for his injury
229. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 2(3), 33 U.S.CA.
§ 902(3) (Supp. 1976).
230. 33 U.S.C.A.§ 903(a) (Supp. 1976).
231. The proposed guidelines originally appeared at 20 C.F.R. Part 710 (1974).
but they have been dropped and no longer appear at that point. They were reproduced
in 1A B=nanICr ON AmmS.rALTY app. B-61 (Supp. 1975).
232. 1A BrqExocr ON ArnmImTr app. B-61, at 69 (Supp. 1975).
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to happen. Accordingly, if there is any conceivable way to squeeze "ship-
breaking" into the situs sentence, it will certainly be done. An extremely
loose interpretation of ship "building" or "repairing" might be resorted to,
although the scrapping process is in real life viewed as a separate category.
Of course, if dry docks, building ways, or marine railways are involved in
the breaking operation, this would take care of the problem. Moreover, if
the area is a diversified one where building, repairing, and scrapping go on
side by side, the overall character of the area could be allowed to control.
The difficulty would be at its greatest in the case of a specialized shipbreak-
ing yard, which does nothing else, and in which none of the name facilities
are involved. Even here, if such a case should arise, a court would probably
end by giving effect to the obvious intent of Congress reflected clearly in
its express inclusion of a "ship-breaker" in the employee definition. Anyone
familiar with the history of the 1972 amendments can easily understand
how a slip like this could happen. When one thinks of the frantic 4 A.M.
final conference mark-up sessions, with dozens of far-reaching and contro-
versial changes being adjusted, traded, and reconciled under intense time
pressure, it is not surprising that the gears should not mesh here and there,2a
and courts can no doubt be counted on to take as charitable a view of the
result as the language will bear.
K. Miscellaneous Maritime Employments
Although the great bulk of maritime employments fall within the cate-
gories specifically named - "any longshoreman or other person engaged in
longshoring activities, and any harborworker including a ship repairman,
shipbuilder, and ship-breaker" - it should not be forgotten that the basic
operative coverage phrase is "any person engaged in maritime employment."
It is perfectly possible, therefore, for a person to be covered although not
employed in any of the activities explicitly listed.
Thus, in Sharp v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.Y- the decedent was an
engineer participating in a special scuba diving training program sponsored
by his employer. The purpose of the training was to qualify decedent as
a diver competent to inspect the employer's underwater facilities and struc-
tures. The Board held decedent to have been in covered maritime employ-
ment. The Board said:
233. Another example of an apparent oversight was the failure to put a fixed week-
ly maximum on death benefits comparable to that on disability benefits, as a result of
which the only maximum was the decedent's own average weekly wages. See Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 9(e), 33 U.S.C.A. § 909(o)
(Supp. 1976). But see Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v.
O'Keefe, 545 F.2d 337 (3d Cir. 1976). The Third Circuit, noting the omission men-
tioned at this point, managed to extract from the statute a congressional intent that
the weekly maximum benefit limit should apply to death benefits. Justice Aldslert
dissented from this "strained construction." Id. at 348.
The District of Columbia Circuit reached the same conclusion in Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs v. Boughman. 545 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
234. 2 Benefits Review Board Serv. 381 (1975).
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Although "maritime employment" includes... any longshore-
man or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any
harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-
breaker. . ., it is not limited to persons engage in those activities.
33 U.S.C. § 902(3). In this case, in the furtherance of his employer's
business purpose, the decedent was being trained to make under-
water inspections of various structures and facilities, an activity
for which the employer had previously hired only professional
scuba divers.2 5
With this case must be compared, however, the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore.236 In this case a pondman for a lumber
mill was injured when he fell from a floating walkway while sorting logs
in a pond adjacent to a saw mill and guiding them into the mill. The pond
was found to satisfy the test of -navigable waters," since it was in a salt
water bay enclosed by log booms and docks. But the court concluded that
claimant's work did not relate to "traditional maritime activity involving
navigation and commerce on navigable waters."
The court reconstructs the original purpose of the Longshoremen's Act
as providing protection for shipside workers, and sees nothing in the 1972
amendments changing that central objective. The heart of the court's
rationale is in this passage:
The occupational hazards intended to be guarded against
are the traditional hazards to the ship's service employee arising
in the course of his employment: i.e., the perils of the sea and an
unseaworthy vessel recognized under maritime laws. Accordingly
we believe that to be entitled to the benefits of LHCA, an em-
ployee's employment must have a realistic relationship to the tradi-
tional work and duties of a ship's service employment. Otherwise
the clear and unambiguous congressional language of "maritime
employment" is nullified and rendered to read "any employ-
ment" =
In simplest terms, the claimant was a mill worker whose duties hap-
pened to take him on navigable water. The court postulates the case of a
pondman at an upland sawmill doing exactly what the claimant here did,
and sees no reason why the essential character of the pondman's occupation
should alter with the navigable status of the water he happens to be
working on.
The essence of the court's "traditional" concept seems to be that the
work must have something to do with ships - always remembering that
the concept of "ship" has been tremendously broadened in modem times. 
21
Accordingly, and giving the court's rationale its full meaning, it seems
unlikely that the Ninth Circuit would have agreed with the Board's decision
235. Id. at 384.
236. 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 179 (1976).
237. 528 F.2d at 961.
238. See 3 A. LAnsozr, supra note 2, § 90.23.
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in Sharp, since scuba diving to inspect utility installations hardly seems to
fit within the court's description of traditional ship service activity.2-3
VIII. Tim "TwiLici-rr ZONE" AND CoNcUrrNT JuRiSDIraON
DocnurN-s AFTER 1972
There remains the question: What, if anything, did the 1972 amend-
ments do to change the law as to the "twilight zone" and concurrent juris-
diction doctrines?240 The answer seems to be: factually, a great deal; legally,
not much.
The factual change that in practice sharply alters the picture is the
creation of a dramatic disparity in the size of Longshoremen's Act benefits
compared with state benefits. It has been noted that most twilight-zone law
was the product of attempts to get out of the Longshoremen's Act and into
more favorable state acts.241 For various reasons, including notions of mari-
time uniformity under constitutional law, movement in that direction had
special obstacles to overcome, and the twilight zone principle was a way
of surmounting those obstacles. But now we have a situation in which, in
every state but Alaska, the pressure will be to get out of state acts and
into the federal act. Thus, we will see both financial advantage and federal
preeminence pulling in the same direction.
One thing is certain: There is going to be plenty of "twilight" around
the edges of post-1972 coverage.
As to the status test, the I.T.O. decision contrasted with the Benefits
Review Board position, together with the spectrum of circuit court cases in
between and perhaps beyond, has created a shadowland extending all the
way from the bed of an incoming truck to the last "point of rest" of the
cargo before it is placed on the ship.242
All the internal movements of cargo within the warehouse, the loadings
and unloadings short of the ship, the stuffing and palletizing, the stripping,
the repairing of broken containers or equipment, and the clerical work at
every stage - all these activities and the workers who perform them were
in 1976 placed in a twilight zone much more far-reaching than anything
that could have existed before 1972.
Moreover, as to the situs test, the situation is hardly much better. The
first signs of the stretching of "adjoining" navigable waters to reach as far
as the maritime function itself - across the street, two blocks away, and
so on - have already been noted.23 What kind of penumbra will eventually
surround the enlarged "navigable waters" situs only time will tell.
239. It may be noted that the court in Gilmore reversed the Board, and reinstated
a denial of compensation by the law judge. 528 F.2d at 962.
240. For a detailed analysis of te status of these doctrines at the time of the
1972 amendments, see A. LAnSON, supra note 2, §§ 89.24, .25, .35, .40-.70.
241. Refer to notes 23-25 supra.
242. Refer to text following note 104 supra.
243. Refer to text following note 46 supra.
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The principal practical reason for adopting the orignal twilight zone
was that the Supreme Court was plainly tired of the tedious task of sorting
out endless cases as falling on one side or another of the federal jurisdic-
tional boundary.m If that was true in 19492, it will be doubly true after 1972.
Of course, if the Supreme Court believes that the federal act has been
confined much too narrowly, as may well happen in the ITO case, it pre-
sumably will not hesitate to say so. But if the issue arises in the opposite
form, with employers contending that the Act has been stretched too far,
the Supreme Court may soon find itself once more swamped with borderline
cases involving both status and situs, and may quite understandably take
refuge behind some contemporary counterpart to the twilight-zone doctrine.
The constitutional issues do not seem to have been significantly affected
by the amendments. As to the situs test, nothing is changed except the
breadth of the situs. The addition of the "maritime employment" status test
adds no new constitutional complications, since it has long been settled that
a state, when not barred on navigable waters grounds, may validly legislate
as to persons in maritime employment4 5 The deletion of the phrase "may
not validly be provided by state law," while it eliminates the original cause
of the twilight-zone development, seems to have no current impact, since
it was already a dead letter before it was legislatively excised.240
The problem for the future will be one of federal supremacy and statu-
tory preemption. When the concurrent or successive jurisdiction question
takes the form of a state award followed by a federal award, there would
thus be no problem. But suppose a borderline worker in Alaska wants to
escape from the Longshoremen's Act into the higher-paying Alaska act.
The case might first arise as a twilight-zone example. For reasons just
sketched, a holding below in favor of state coverage might well be left
undisturbed. But suppose a Longshoremen's Act award had already been
made. The main ground of the leading pre-1972 case allowing supplemental
state compensation, Hansen v. Perth Amboy Dry Dock Co., 24 7 was not
the "absence of state power clause" but the emergence of the "valid state
interest" test This main ground remained unaffected by the 1972 amend-
ments. Nor did the addition of the "maritime employment" test, as just
noted, raise any new constitutional problems.
As a matter of federal preemption, the courts would probably uphold
the application of the Alaska act as merely supplementing the federal act,
not conflicting with it The purpose of the federal act was to guarantee a
federal remedy of a certain minimum size. The usual tests by which the
validity of state legislation has been judged when attacked under the
supremacy clause appear to be met here..2 48 Especially when Congress has
244. See A. L.woN, supra note 2, §§ 89.24-.25.
245. See State Indus. Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1922).
246. Refer to note 9 supra.
247. 48 NJ. 389, 226 A.2d 4 (1967).
248. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
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moved into an area formerly occupied by state legislation, preemption
would not be presumed:
Congress legislated here in a field which the states have tradi-
tionally occupied. [citation omitted] So we start with the assump-
tion that the .. , power of the States were not meant to be super-
seded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.249
To invoke the supremacy clause, federal interest should be found "so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject."20
In view of the background of pre-1972 concurrent and supplementary
coverage cases, in view of the creation by Congress of large new areas of
uncertainty of coverage putting workers to the possible hazard of wrong
initial choices, and in view of the failure of Congress by express language
in the amendments to preempt the field as against any possible competing
state act, it seems likely that supplementary awards would be upheld even
when the federal award had come first.
249. Id. at 230.
250. Id. Similarly, there may be preemption when "state policy may produce a
result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute." Id. A compensation award,
however, that merely supplements a federal award does not fit this description.
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